Essays in Experimental Economics by Huynh, Khanh Ngoc Han
Essays in Experimental Economics
Khanh Ngoc Han Huynh
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
under the Executive Committee




Khanh Ngoc Han Huynh
All Rights Reserved
Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis is motivated by a puzzle in consumer finance. In high-
stakes financial decisions, people leave a substantial amount of money on the table, even
whenfinancial education is available. The ubiquity of financial choicesmakes understand-
ing the effects of incentives and education on mistakes crucial. This chapter experimen-
tally examines the impact of changes in incentives and educational availability on incen-
tivized but hypothetical healthcare choices using Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find that
increasing incentives are ineffective in increasing decision-making effort, even when these
changes are made clear and salient to the subjects. Yet, surprisingly, despite this lack of ef-
fort response, subjects’ choices improvewhen incentives are high. This result highlights an
under-appreciated channel of incentives: when stakes become larger, often, the problems
become simpler too. We next investigate the effect of available education. Overall, educa-
tion leads to an increase in decision-making effort and an improvement in choice quality.
However, this average effect masks significant heterogeneity across incentive treatments.
Subjects are willing to put in the educational effort when either the problems are hard or
mistakes are highly costly, but the return of the educational effort is zero for hard problems
and positive for easy ones. Thus, only when stakes are high and the problem is easy does
education have an effect. These findings suggest that people can be encouraged to get ed-
ucation for high-stakes decisions, and policy-makers have a role in simplifying problems
to translate the extra effort into better choices.
The second chapter dives deeper into the “easiness” channel of incentives. This chap-
ter uses an experiment to disentangle “easiness” from the standard incentives on savings
account choices, again using AmazonMechanical Turk. We show that increasing the vari-
ance of the accounts improves choices without increasing time spent. This is true in both
between-subject and within-subject analyses. Besides, we re-investigate the effects of in-
centives and education. We recover the usual effects of incentives, where paying subjects
a higher rate motivates them to spend more time and do better. We also find that easi-
ness and incentives complement education. Consistent with the literature, we show that
the effectiveness of education diminishes with time, suggesting that education should be
provided as and when people make decisions.
In the third chapter finds experimental evidence for preference for flexibility (PFF).
Although PFF is very intuitive, documenting PFF experimentally faces challenges from
stochastic choices. Because there are random noises in decision-making, experimental
datamayover-estimate PFFdue to such randomness. This chapter tackles stochastic choices
by first deriving theoretical upper bounds for PFF.We thenmeasure PFF against these up-
per bounds using menu choices presented in the Multiple Price Lists (MPLs) in a lab ex-
periment. We find that subjects exhibit more PFF than what can be explained by random
noises. Specifically, there are more PFF than two countervailing behaviors, indifference
and preference for commitment. We then present two alternative models for PFF, which
have different predictions for the effect of the probability of payment on PFF. We suggest
a modified experiment to tell these two models apart for future research.
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dictions liberates me from the anxiety I have over mine. For that, he has made me a better
person.
I thank my dad for espousing democratic values at home. In all things big or small, he
always asks for my opinion. I then thank my mom for crushing all voting procedures in
the family under her dictatorship. Sometimes it is tiring to answer all of these questions
and it is just better to outsource decisions to someone else. For their opposing traits and
all of the other things that my parents are and they are not, I am grateful.
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Dedication
To absurdity. For the suffering, the laughter, and the conviction.
Bill Waterson. Calvin and Hobbes.
Calvin: Isn’t it strange that evolution would give us a sense of humor? When you think
about it, it’sweird thatwehave a physiological response to absurdity. We laugh
at nonsense. We like it. We think it’s funny. Don’t you think it’s odd that we
appreciate absurdity? Why would we develop that way? How does it benefit
us?
Hobbes: I suppose if we couldn’t laugh at things that don’t make sense, we couldn’t
react to a lot of life.
Calvin: I can’t tell if that’s funny or really scary.
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Preface
Central to economic analysis are two components, cost and benefit. While economic
agents make decisions based on the balance of cost and benefit, interventions and policies
are often designed to target either one of these components. For example, income taxes
change the benefit of working while industry regulations affect the cost of doing busi-
nesses. This thesis focuses on one intervention, changing choice spread, and shows that
choice spread can affect both cost and benefit. In this preface, we define choice spread and
discuss how we can understand its effects and its application. We also summarize our
evidence on choice spread from the first two chapters of this thesis.
Easiness and Incentives in Choice Spread
Choice spread is the variance of the options in the choice set. This variance could be
of utility or of option characteristics. If the variance is that of utility, greater choice spread
affects benefits. When bad options are much worse than good options, mistakes are more
consequential; and hence, people pay more attention to their decisions. If the variance is
that of characteristics, as we elaborate in the rest of this preface, choice spread also affects
costs, or more specifically, productivity. When the variance of characteristics is higher, the
differences among options aremore apparent, which allows the DM to find the best option
more effectively.
More concretely, consider a decision-maker (DM) choosing from set X = {xi}. Each
xi has a list of characteristics xij’s. For example, if xi’s are housing prices, then xi1’s are
the base prices, xi2’s taxes, xi3’s repair costs, etc. In standard analysis, the DM integrates all
characteristics xij’s to a utility u(xi), as shown in figure 0.0.1a. If the variance of one feature,
say xi1’s, increases, the variance of u(xi)’s increases. This makes putting efforts into finding
the best option more worthwhile, which is the effect of choice spread on benefits.
The effect of choice spread on productivity is more subtle. To make the explanation
clearer, consider breaking the decision-making process into two steps, as shown in figure
1
Figure 0.0.1: Decision-making Process









































0.0.1b. Before assigning utilities, the DM performs an intermediate “processing” step.
Broadly, this “processing” step may contain either or both of the following actions:
a. Perceive/understand xij’s
b. Combine xij’s into a representation ri’s
Take the example of housing prices again. In action a, the DMmay have to collect and
understand all information about her purchase. In action b, she may have to combine
all xij’s into final prices for comparison. In our experiments, ri’s are single numbers but
generally, ri’s can be vectors. For example, the DM “reduces dimensions” from (xij)j to ri,
which has only characteristics relevant to her utilities.
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We discuss how choice spread affects actions a and b although, as we argue later, ac-
tion b is more relevant to our experiments. For action a, that humans imprecisely per-
ceive sensory information, leading to better perception of “further” stimuli compared to
“closer” ones has been long studied in psychophysics (Wei and Stocker (2017),Woodford
(2019)). Notably, sensory information includes numerical perception (Moyer and Lan-
dauer (1967)), which has found application in economics (Khaw et al. (2018)). As such,
when the variance of xij’s increases, it may become easier to perceive their differences (for
example, 100 and 200 versus 100 and 101) and the DMmay becomemore effective in find-
ing the best option.
For action b, while we use the word representation ri’s above for generality, in our ex-
periments, this action involves calculation which is subject to random mistakes. Mistakes
include mundane errors such as entering the wrong numbers (for example, writing 15 in-
stead of 51) and doing the sums inaccurately or more serious ones such as wrong concept
application (for example, thinking that insurance premiums are paid only when you use
health services). When xij’s are far from each other, resulting in ri’s being far from each
other, any one such mistake matters less. Hence, even when the DM puts in the same
amount of effort, she may make better decisions under greater choice spread.
Although there is a lot of evidence elsewhere for action a being themechanism through
which choice spread affects choice accuracy, action bplays amore crucial role in our exper-
iments. First, we use imperceptible changes in variance of xij’s to induce large changes in
the variance of ri’s. The numerical manipulation from applying financial concepts allows
us to magnify the small changes in xij’s.1 Second, difficulty in perception is traditionally
identified by a greater amount of time spent on the tasks. This is not the case in our ex-
periments: subjects facing a smaller choice spread spend the same amount of time on the
task as those with a larger choice spread. We, thus, conclude that calculation mistakes is
the main mechanism in this thesis.
1The author will not be able to identify the large choice spread treatment even when the treatments are
presented side by side.
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Given the effects of choice spread on action b, there are three follow-up questions. We
list the questions and speculate on the answers but each question merits its own research.
1. Which of the calculation mistakes are dominant?
Although careless errors are always present, in our experiments, wrong concept ap-
plication likely contributes significantly to the effect of choice spread. This is because
we find that choice spread and education are complementary to each other. If sub-
jects make only random “irreducible” errors, we should not observe the interaction
between choice spread and education.
2. What are the limits to the effect of choice spread on action b?
We expect the effects do not apply to scaling the option characteristics. Research
in psychophysics shows that scaling does not impact action a, which we expect to
extend to action b.2 Besides, we expect that if the difference in u(xi)’s are are large
enough, people will invest in technology to remove these mistakes.
3. Beyond calculation, does action b cover any other tasks?
Memory tasks seem to be a good candidate to think more broadly about action b.
How do we relate the effect of choice spread on productivity to the standard effect
on benefits? First, they are conceptually distinct. The effect on benefits works through
the variance of u(xi)’s, motivating the DM to put more or less effort into her decisions.
The effect on productivity works through the variance of ri’s: conditional on an effort level,
the DM is more or less effective at finding the best choice. In other words, the effect on
productivity is payoff-irrelevant.
Second, the effects can be disentangled using effort measurement. Consider the case
when choice spread is lower. If we focus on benefits, a lower choice spread demotivates
2The exchange rate between the US dollar and the Vietnamese Dong is at 1 USD ∼ 23,000 VND in July
2020. The author doubts that Vietnamese consumers make fewer mistakes than US consumers because of
this exchange rate. She, for one, thought that “thousand” was the name of the Vietnamese currency when
she was a child because most prices ended with “thousand”.
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effort. In contrast, if we focus on costs, a lower choice spread leads to a harder choice
which increases effort. As such, not only can we disentangle these two channels of choice
spread by measuring effort but doing so matters for welfare analyses. For instance, if we
proxy effort by time and have access to data on wages, we can have a full account of effects
of choice spread.
Oneway to integrate the effect of choice spread on productivity is to augment the ratio-
nal inattention literature (Sims (1998),Matějka and McKay (2015)). In the most common
formulation of rational attention, the attention cost comprises of an information measure,
for example, the Shannon mutual information, and a constant marginal cost. The DM
acquires the optimal amount of information based on this attention cost and the utility
difference between choices. When choice spread changes, besides the standard effect on
utility difference, we can add to this model an effect on the marginal information cost.
When marginal cost decreases, to find the same amount of information, the DM needs
less effort; equivalently, the same amount of effort yields more information.
Two comments are worth making here regarding the effects of choice spread. One, we
assume that the increase in the variance of xij’s increases the variances of ri’s and u(xi)’s.
It is easy to think of situations where features offset one another, and an increase in the
variance of xij’s decreases the variance of ri’s instead. This falls outside ofwhatwe consider
although understanding how the DMs combine opposite features is both interesting and
crucial.
Two, the discussion on the effects of choice spread on costs focuses solely on “pro-
cessing” noise. It is possible that there are also noises in the “utility assignment” after
“processing”. However, the experiments in this thesis point more convincingly to the ex-
istence of “processing” noises. Whether noises in “utility assignment” are present are left
for future research.
Applications of Easiness in Choice Spread
That people make calculation mistakes can be applied to many consumer decisions.
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This thesis focuses on financial decisions but consumers routinely perform calculations
such as adding taxes to their purchases (Chetty et al. (2009)) or summing add-ons of
services (Gabaix and Laibson (2006)). Particularly, if wrong concept application proves to
be a major contributor to mistakes, we can expect choice spread to have a significant effect
on decisions because the listed calculations require a consumers’ correct understanding
and application.
More broadly, we can think about the effects of choice spread on general perception,
not just calculation, as part of the repertoir to nudge people to better decisions. For in-
stance, we can augment product description with payoff-irrelevant characteristics to help
consumers distinguish options. One example is using serial numbers. We may optimiz-
ing those numbers to capture product differences as well as provide a check for consumers
attempting to categorizing products for themselves.
In a note on methodology, this thesis contributes to the discussion of enriching eco-
nomic measurement with psychological and neural aspects (Camerer (2008),Caplin and
Dean (2008)). By proxying effort with time, we show a surprising channel inwhich choice
spread affects productivity. Note that adding time is a rather basic addition compared to
the technological advances in measurement. We expect that better measurement will lead
to better understanding of potential obstacles to decision-making and their solutions.
Evidence of Easiness and Incentives
We now summarize the experimental evidence from this thesis on the effects of choice
spread. Both experiments ask subjects to choose the best financial products for hypo-
thetical scenarios. We increase the choice spread by changing only one characteristics of
xi’s, conveniently labeled as xi1. In chapter 1, xi’s are health insurance plans and xi1’s are
premiums. In chapter 2, xi’s are savings accounts and xi1’s are initial deposits. Besides
the different tasks, in chapter 1, xi1’s change both ri’s and u(xi)’s while in chapter 2, xi1’s
change only ri’s. On top of the treatment in choice spread, chapter 1 has disclosure and
education treatments and chapter 2 has incentives and education treatments. We discuss
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first the individual treatments and then the interaction between treatments.
In both chapters, we find that when choice spread increases, subjects make better
choices despite spending the same amount of time. Hence, both tasks show that the re-
turn to time is higher under higher choice spread. The subtle difference between the ex-
periments is that because in chapter 2, a higher variance of ri’s is not accompanied by a
higher variance of u(xi)’s, we can say that the return to effort, and not just time, is higher.
Meanwhile, chapter 1 requires a follow-up experiment to separate ri and u(xi), which also
suggests that we can equate time to effort in this task. We, thus, conclude that the higher
variance of ri’s makes the problems easier.
That we can equate time to effort in chapter 1 relates to our finding that higher u(xi)’s,
as proxied by highermonetary reward, has little effects at baseline in chapter 1. In contrast,
in chapter 2, higher variance of u(xi)’s both increases subjects’ time spent and improves
choices. In chapter 1, we find that after controlling for ri’s in the follow-up experiment, the
higher variance of u(xi)’s does not have any additional effects on either time or choices.
Moreover, disclosure treatments, in which we make incentives transparent to subjects, do
not have any effects. This is despite the suggestive evidence that subjects cannot guess
the incentive levels when they are undisclosed. Although it has been documented that
monetary incentives may not always have the expected effects (Gneezy et al. (2011)), it is
interesting to see the divergence in two environments which are exactly the same, except
for the steps to complete the tasks.3
On the education treatment, we find that providing education is effective in both tasks.
Subjects who have access to materials do better. However, the mechanisms throughwhich
education affects choices are different. In chapter 1, providing education increases the
amount of time subjects spend on the task while in chapter 2, the amount of time stays
3To choose a health insurance plan, subjects have to understand a few concepts (premium, deductible,
co-insurance, maximum out-of-pocket) and how they relate to health-care scenarios. In contrast, to choose
a savings account, subjects only need to understand compound interest rates. Whether it is the “multiple
versus one concept” or the “multiple versus one step of application” that is responsible for the divergence
is an area for future research. An example of “multiple concepts” but “one step application” is an exam in
which students are tested only one concept among the multiple concepts they are taught.
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the same. Our qualitative evidence shows that in chapter 2, subjects substitute from other
methods of choosing the savings accounts to applying the educational materials, which
may explain why they do not spend more time when education is available.
Besides the effects of the individual treatments, both experiments also find that eas-
iness and incentives complement education although the mechanisms of the interaction
are different. On easiness and education, in chapter 1, education is effective only when
the problems are easy. In fact, studying is in vain when problems are hard. In chapter 2,
the effects are not as stark. When the problems are easy, subjects do not need to study as
much for education to have the same effect as when the problems are hard.
On incentives and education, in chapter 1, a higher incentive increases educational
time. In chapter 2, although a higher incentive does not change educational time, edu-
cation is more effective under high incentives. This is probably related to the evidence
that in chapter 2, subjects substitute other methods to applying the educational materials.
That subjects apply the materials more under high incentives could explain the results in
chapter 2. Hence, although in both cases, high incentives boost education effectiveness,
how they do so varies by the task.
In summary, we find that the effects of choice spread on costs or easiness to be robust.
This is noteworthy especially given that the effects of standard incentives and education
are different in many aspects. While these differences most likely stem from the tasks
being different, the experiments also highlight the importance of supplementing choice
measurement with effort measurement to provide a more complete understanding of the
decision-making process.
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Chapter 1: Effects of Incentives and Education
on Financial Choices 1
1.1 Introduction
Research in household finance has shown that consumersmakefinancially sub-optimal
choices, thus, leaving a substantial amount of money on the table in various types of fi-
nancial decisions (loans in Agarwal et al. (2009), Bertrand and Morse (2011), insurance
in Bhargava et al. (2015), Abaluck and Gruber (2011), and investment in Beshears et al.
(2011)). One obvious explanation is that people lack the skills to make these decisions
well. Yet, the literature finds that these mistakes persist even when financial education is
available. A recent meta-analysis on financial literacy and financial behaviors finds that
education has surprisingly little effects on choices (Fernandes et al. (2014)). Why do con-
sumers choose financially sub-optimal products even though mistakes are highly costly
and education is freely available?
As a starting point to answering the question, this project designs an experiment to
identify the effects of incentives and education on financial choices. This experimentmim-
ics the choice of health insurance, a setting in which consumers incur significant losses
and often misunderstand how the products work (Bhargava et al. (2015), Loewenstein
et al. (2013)).2 We recruit Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers to choose insur-
ance plans for hypothetical scenarios. Each scenario consists of deterministic health-care
1I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-1919483),
the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for Social Sciences, the Microeconomic Colloquium, and the Mi-
croeconomic Theory Initiative for this project.
2Loewenstein et al. (2013) shows that consumers choose dominated plans, which are worse than another
available plan regardless of preferences.
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needs so that the total health costs of all listed plans are deterministic.3 The objectively cor-
rect choice is then the lowest-cost plan, and subjects receive a higher payment for choosing
a lower-cost plan. Within this task, we vary the stakes and access to education. The varia-
tions allowus to test whether incentives and educationmatter for choices, themechanisms
by which they do so, and the effects of their interaction.
To vary the stakes, we design low- and high-incentive treatments. Each subject is ran-
domized into one incentive level, which corresponds to a high or low cost of an average
mistake. We make incentives higher by changing the premiums such that the variance of
the total health costs increases. Because this increases the difference between the best plan
and a randomly chosen plan is higher, mistakes become more costly.
We first look at the impact of incentives on howmuch effort subjects put into choosing
a plan. When people make bad choices even with high stakes, there are two possible
explanations. Either people do not increase effort with high stakes, or the extra effort is in
vain. Using time spent on the task as a proxy for effort, we find evidence for the former
hypothesis: subjects do not increase effort when incentives are higher.4 There is no effect
of high stakes on time, although the best plan in the high-incentive treatment is worth two
times that in the low-incentive treatment.
One possible reason why subjects do not spend more time could be that they do not
know the stakes. In our experiment, as in real-life insurance decisions, without calculating
the variance of the total health costs, subjects may fail to realize how much their mistakes
matter. If they do not know that they are in a high-stakes environment, they may not put
in the effort. To test this hypothesis, within each incentive level, we implement another
treatment, disclosure, in which subjects are told the stakes before they choose insurance
plans. We find that disclosure does not change the results: knowing the underlying stakes
does not impact the time spent. We, thus, conclude that subjects do not spend more time
3Total health costs are the sums of the premiums and the costs of using the medical services, called “out-
of-pocket” costs.
4We use the time to proxy for effort because careful decisions take time. However, time is not a perfect
measure. We discuss these shortcomings further in the design (section 1.3) and the results (section 1.4).
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deciding because they perceive the returns of effort to be small, or at least smaller than the
increase in incentives.
Although effort does not changewith higher incentives, surprisingly, subjects do better,
improving the number of correct answers by 0.28 from the base of 1.4 correct answers (out
of 5). This hints at an under-explored alternative channel through which incentives affect
choices, reducing difficulty. When incentives increase, the difference in the total health
costs is larger, and hence, it may be easier to tell a good plan from a bad one.5 While
the results so far point towards this channel, we cannot disentangle difficulty from high
incentives in this design. We conducted a follow-up experiment to do so.6 This introduced
a “low-easy” treatment, which scales the high-incentive (or “easy”) questions using a new
exchange rate between the experimental points and the dollar amounts subjects receive.
Doing so achieves the low-incentive payment but keeps the “easy” structure the same. We
find that subjects in the “low-easy” treatment do better without spending more time than
those in the original low-incentive treatment. As such, we confirm that high-incentive
problems are indeed easier.
In summary, we identify two potential channels by which incentives affect perfor-
mance: increasing effort and reducing difficulty. We find no evidence for the former chan-
nel but evidence for the latter, which is surprising. Both are general effects of incentives,
but the latter channel has received less attention. Both of these channels could interact,
separately or together, with education.
Next, we study the impact of financial education on decision processes. We do so
by randomly making education available to some subjects. These subjects have access
to worked-out examples illustrating the steps to choose a good plan through a series of
buttons at the end of each question. By measuring the time lapse between button clicks,
5For example, when a good plan costs $800 and a bad plan costs $810, subjects need only make a calcu-
lation error of $10 to choose wrongly. However, if the plan costs $900 instead, the calculation error has to
$100, which is less likely, for the subjects to choose the bad plan.
6A possible effect of high incentives could be effort intensity. Subjects may work harder in the same
amount of time. The follow-up experiment removes this channel. We also discuss this channel further in
the results in section 1.4.
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we can measure the extent to which subjects use the materials and whether that improves
choices. Moreover, we randomize education with the incentive treatment to study the
interaction between education and incentives.
A natural explanation for ineffective financial education is that people do not use the
materials. We do not find this to be the case in our experiment. 32% of subjects with
available education use the materials. Furthermore, because the overall time on the task
increases, the use of the educationalmaterials does not fully substitute time spent onmeth-
ods that may have been used in the absence of education. We also find that providing
education has a positive effect on performance, improving the number of correct answers
by 0.22.
We now turn to the interaction between education and incentives. One may expect
that a high incentive encourages more educational effort, but we find that subjects in the
low-incentive treatment spend as much time in the educational materials as those in the
high-incentive treatment. Given the identified channels behind incentives, we know that
the low-incentive questions are hard; so, subjects are willing to put in the educational
effort for hard problems.7 However, it is less clear what causes the educational effort in the
“high-easy” treatment. The follow-up experiment pins down the reason to incentives, and
not ease: subjects in the “low-easy” treatment do not put in the time to read the materials.
As a result, we conclude that subjects use educational materials either when problems are
hard or when mistakes are highly costly.
As effort increases equally for both incentive levels, i.e., for both “high-easy” and “low-
hard” problems, the interaction between education and incentives sheds light on whether
the benefits of educational effort differ across difficulty levels. We find that providing
education improves performance for easy questions but not for hard ones. In other words,
the return of education is zero for hard problems, but it is potentially positive for easy
problems.
7Low incentives could not have motivated subjects. So the educational effort must have been due to task
difficulty.
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To further understand subjects’ choices, we also look for heterogeneous effects and
the type of mistakes subjects make. Using a separate calculation task to classify subjects,
we find that those who do well in the calculation task also do well in the insurance task.
They are also better at improving their choices when the questions are easy. On the type
of mistakes, we check if a dollar increase in premiums has the same weight as a dollar
increase in “out-of-pocket” costs. Our evidence suggests that this is not the case: subjects
place more weight on premiums. Providing education also increases subjects’ sensitivity
to premiums more, underscoring that education is more effective for easier problems.
Overall, there are three main findings of this project. First, high incentives have a sur-
prising alternative channel in making the problems simpler. Second, subjects perceive
education to be beneficial in either hard problems or high-stakes environment. Third, the
actual return of education is positive for easy problems but zero for hard problems. The
combination of the last two findings suggests that in financial choices, people could be en-
couraged to use education when stakes are high, but policy-makers should aim to reduce
the difficulty of the problems so that the educational effort translates to better choices.
The above results were derived from two experiments. The main experiment recruited
2009 subjects, and the follow-up experiment recruited another 603 subjects. We paid sub-
jects a participation fee and a bonus based on their choice. In the main experiment, we
randomized subjects into eight treatments from a 2× 2× 2 design, incentive × disclosure
× available education. In the follow-up experiment, there were three treatments: “low-
hard-no education”, “low-easy-no education”, and “low-easy-education”. At the end of
the experiment, subjects saw their bonus, and we transferred the payment to their MTurk
account.
This project contributes to several strands of the literature. Other experimental pa-
pers have used hypothetical insurance choices to study financial decisions (Johnson et al.
(2013); Bhargava et al. (2015)). However, neither of themmanipulate incentives by chang-
ing the features of the plans or study the effects of incentives on effort and the interaction
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between incentives and education. By manipulating incentives via changing premiums,
our paper shows that high incentives do not affect effort, but they still matter by reduc-
ing difficulty. We also find an interaction between incentives and education on improving
choices.
In the broader consumer finance literature, there is much interest in both disclosure
and education. Existing papers disclose incentives by translating financial concepts (for
instance, interest rate) into dollar amounts (Bertrand andMorse (2011);Goda et al. (2014)).
We disclose incentives by showing the dollar difference between the best option and a ran-
domly chosen option. On financial education, the literature, despite its size, has not said
much on the factors contributing to education effectiveness. Our experiment shows that
varying the structure of the products, premiums in our case, can complement education.
For the rest of this paper, we proceed with a simple framework in section 1.2, which
highlights the mechanisms of incentives and education. We then show howwe vary these
three elements in our experiment in section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents our results from the
experiment. Section 1.5 details the follow-up experiment and its results. Finally, we relate
this paper to related literature in section 1.6 and conclude in section 1.7.
1.2 Framework
This section presents a framework capturing the key elements in the decision envi-
ronment: incentive, disclosure, and education availability, which we map to the health
insurance task. Then, using the framework, we show that measuring effort identifies the
channels through which incentives and education have an effect.
1.2.1 Setting
Consider a decision-maker (DM) i who chooses from a list of insurance plans. This
choice can be of high-stakes or low-stakes: the difference between the best plan and a ran-
dom choice can be large or small. The stakes are denoted as an unknown s ∈ {H,L}with
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a known prior P(s = H) = µ.8 These stakes can be disclosed or undisclosed. We denote
disclosure as d ∈ {U,D}. Educational materials may or may not be available, denoted as
l ∈ {0, 1}.
The above three elements, s, d, and l, feature in the DM’s timeline to choose a plan as
follows:
1. The DM forms her belief of the stakes, ŝi(s, d) = Pi(s = H)
2. The DM decides how much effort, ei, and how much educational effort, eil to spend
3. The DM receives the result of her choice, fi(ei; s)
We explain each of the above steps in turn. Before attempting the choice, the DM forms
her belief of s, ŝi(s, d). If she is in the disclosed treatment, d = D, we display s transpar-
ently. As a result, the DM’s belief is degenerate and correct: ŝi(H,D) = 1 and ŝi(L,D) = 0.
If the DM is in the undisclosed treatment, d = U , we do not give her any other informa-
tion about s except the prior µ. Shemay examine and compare the plans tomove her belief
(correctly or incorrectly) towards eitherH or L. She may decide not to do so andmaintain
the belief at µ. In any of the cases, ŝi(·) is the DM’s belief before she makes any decisions.
The DM then decides howmuch effort ei ≥ 0 to choose a plan. If education is available,
l = 1, then ei may contain eil ≥ 0, the effort put into studying the educational materials.
Formally, we decompose ei as ei = eil + ein, where eil is the educational efforts and ein
includes all other types of effort. Note that when education is unavailable, l = 0, then
eil = 0.
The DM’s effort translates to the number of correct answers, fi(ei; s) = fi(eil, ein; s)
where fi(eil, ein; ·) is concave in each of the component of effort. We allow s to affect the
number of correct answers (conditional on the same level of effort) because, under high
stakes, the plan costs are further apart, so it may be simpler to tell a good plan from a bad
one. For example, if the DM estimates the costs of the plans, under high stakes, she needs
8The experiment uses a simple uniform prior: 50% high-stakes and 50% low-stakes.
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to make a large estimation error to confuse the relative quality of the plans. Meanwhile,
under low stakes, she need only make a small error to choose the wrong plan. s can, thus,
affect fi directly.
The DM’s optimization problem is:
maxeil,ein Eŝi(·)(s)fi(eil, ein; s)− (eil + ein)
subject to eil = 0 if l = 0
The DM perceives the return to her effort to be her task performance fi(·) multiplied
by the expected reward of doing well, which is the expected stakes under her belief ŝi(·).
Since fi(eil, ein, ·) is concave, we can assume that the cost of effort is linear, without loss of







Because we assume that f(·) is concave, then an increase in ŝi(·), i.e., a greater belief
that the choice is high-stakes, leads to an increase in e∗i (·). Note that the choices of e∗il(·)
and e∗in(·) satisfy the same condition. With this framework, we can study the effects of
incentives and education.
1.2.2 Effort Identifies the Mechanisms of Incentives and Education
We look at the roles of incentives and education in turn. Using our setting, we can
decompose the effect of incentives on performance, fi(·) into two components as follows:
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∆fi(L→ H, ·) = fi(e∗i (H, ·), H)− fi(e∗i (L, ·), L)
= (fi(e
∗




i (L, ·), H)− fi(e∗i (L, ·), L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Difficulty
(1.2)
Equation (1.2) show thatwithoutmeasuring incentives, wehave an identificationprob-
lemwhen ∆fi(·) is positive. If incentives affect choices, there can be two explanations: the
DM increasing effort or the problem becoming simpler. It is natural to lean toward the
former explanation. But equation (1.2) clarifies that this may not be the case; indeed, as
we shall see in our results in section 1.4, difficulty explains a positive ∆fi(L→ H, ·).
When the DM’s effort does not increase with s, from the optimization condition in
equation 1.1, we can attribute the lack of effort response to two cases. In the first case,
Eŝi(·)(s) 6= s; although s increases, ŝi(s, d) may not move towards H accordingly or at
all. To evaluate this reason, we can compare the efforts when stakes are disclosed, i.e.,
comparing e∗il(L,D, ·) with e∗il(H,D, ·). If e∗il(H,D, ·) > e∗il(L,D, ·), then the DM does not
increase effort because she does not realize that she is in a high-stakes environment even
when s = H . Otherwise, if e∗il(H,D, ·) = e∗il(L,D, ·), then the DM does not increase effort
because of the second case: ∂fi(·)
∂ei
, or the returns of effort, is low.
We now turn to the effect of education. If the DMdoes not put in the educational effort,
it is hard to see how education may have an effect. So, we consider the effects of education
on choices only when e∗il(·) > 0. When the DM uses the materials, three scenarios can
happen to the overall effort, each of which corresponds to a different relation between
eil and ein. First, if the cross derivative ∂
2fi(·)
∂eil∂ein
< −1, the educational effort reduces the
usefulness of other methods more than proportionately, i.e., eil more than substitutes ein.
As a result, e∗i (·) decreases, i.e., education saves effort. The return to education then needs
to take into account this reduction in effort besides any change in ∆fi(0→ 1, ·). Second, if
∂2fi(·)
∂eil∂ein
= −1, then eil exactly substitutes ein; so, any changes in fi(·) evaluate the relative
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effectiveness of eil and ein. In the last case, ∂
2fi(·)
∂eil∂ein
> −1, e∗il does not fully substitute e∗in
and e∗i (·) increases.
Finally, given that we study incentives and education, we can investigate whether their
interaction changes behaviors. Intuitively, we expect high incentives encourages more ed-
ucational effort, i.e., ∆e∗il(0 → 1, H, ·) > ∆e∗il(0 → 1, L, ·). However, because s can affect
how difficult the choice is, it is possible that the reverse is true: the DM believes that when
the choice is more difficult, educational effort is more beneficial. In either case, if the inter-
action affects effort, we can ask whether the higher effort is associated with more effective
education.
In summary, measuring efforts allow us to identify the channels through which in-
centives (effort versus difficulty) and education (educational materials substituting other
methods or not) affect choices. Specifically, we use this framework to guide our analysis
through the following questions:
1. Does effort increase with incentives, e∗i (H, ·) > e∗i (L, ·)?
If it does, change in performance is associated with the DM working harder. If it
does not, change in performance is associated with the problem becoming simpler.
2. If effort does not increase with incentives, does it increase with disclosed incentives,
e∗i (H,D, ·) > e∗i (L,D, ·)?
If it does, then the lack of effort response is due to wrong perceived reward to doing
well. If it does not, then the lack of effort response is due to low returns of effort.
3. Does performance change with incentives, ∆fi(L→ H, ·)?
4. Does the DM use educational materials, e∗il > 0? If the DM uses the materials, does
providing education change the overall effort, e∗i ?
The combination of changes in e∗il(·) and e∗i (·) reveal whether the educational mate-
rials substitute or complement other methods of choosing an insurance plan.mf
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5. Does providing education improve performance, ∆fi(0→ 1)?
6. Does the interaction between education and incentives affect effort and performance,
∆e∗il(0→ 1, H, ·) > ∆e∗il(0→ 1, L, ·) and ∆fi(0→ 1, H, ·) > ∆fi(0→ 1, L, ·)?
1.3 Experimental Design
This section details our experimental design. We first outline the experimental setting:
our subjects, their tasks, and their compensation. We then describe the treatments in the
main experiment and the follow-up experiment. Finally, we describe the data we collect
for performance and effort.
1.3.1 Decision Environment: Subjects, Tasks and Payment
We recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which is a plat-
form used by many social science experiments seeking a more representative population
than university students. We restricted the subject pool to US workers because we would
like the subjects to be familiar with the US health plan structure, which we use to design
our plans. We posted the experiment as a Human Intelligence Task (HIT). Those who ac-
cepted the HIT followed a link to the experiment designed in Qualtrics, an online survey
platform. For compensation, we paid them a participation fee of $2 and a bonus based
on their choices in the experiment. The bonus is designed to incentivize subjects to spend
effort, as further illustrated below.
As MTurk is an online platform, there is a worry that bots, instead of human workers,
participated in the experiment. To minimize this concern, we restricted the subject pool to
those who have completed more than 1,000 tasks and with approval ratings of more than
95%. Besides, workers needed to pass a captcha before entering in our experimental page.
We discuss further this concern in our results in section 1.4.
Subjects completed two tasks: a calculation task, and then, a health insurance task.
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Since we expect subjects to base their insurance choices on arithmetic estimations, we use
the calculation task to understand the subjects’ baseline motivation and skills. We also
classify subjects based on subjects’ performance in the calculation task to measure hetero-
geneous treatment effects. At the end of the experiment, we choose one question from
each task randomly and convert subjects’ choices to the bonus.
We describe each task in turn. In the calculation task, there are four questions, an
example of which is in figure 1.3.1. Each question contains four options, each option a
sum. Subjects choose one sum, which earns points amounting to 5,000 minus the chosen
sum. For example, for the question in figure 1.3.1, the first sum is 4,880. If a subject picks
this sum, her points are 5,000 – 4,880 = 120. The bonus payment is then 1 cent for each
point. So, picking the first sum earns $1.20 if the question in figure 1.3.1 is chosen for
payment. 9 In this way, a subject earns the most points, and hence, the most money if she
picks the smallest sum.
Figure 1.3.1: Calculation Task
After the calculation task, subjects complete the main task, a health insurance task.
This task has five questions, an example of which is in figure 1.3.2. 1.3.2a zooms into the
structure of the question. First, there is a hypothetical deterministic health-care scenario.
Second, there are four plans whose structure mimics a US health insurance plan with a
deductible, a co-payment/co-insurance, and a maximum out-of-pocket cost.10 Subjects
choose a plan for the scenario. Because the health care scenario is deterministic, the costs
9There are step-by-step instructions and comprehension questions of how the bonus payment works
before each task. Subjects cannot proceed to the task without passing the comprehension questions.
10Appendix A.3 provides more information on these terms.
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of all plans are deterministic. The lowest-cost plan is the objectively correct answer. Sub-
jects’ points in this task equal 10,000 minus the total cost of the chosen plan. So, they
are incentivized to choose the lowest-cost plan, which matches real-life decisions. This
payment scheme explains the scheme for the calculation task: we would like to maintain
consistency in how we pay subjects to minimize confusion.
Figure 1.3.2: Health Insurance Task
(a) Question (b) Question and Material
Each question in the insurance task has accompanyingmaterials to help subjects choose
a plan. The materials always include glossary definitions which are the standard defini-
tions available with any real-life plan. Figure 1.3.2b shows a complete screenshot of a
question followed by the materials.
At the end of the experiment, we ask subjects debriefing questions. For example, we
ask subjects what they think is the stakes underlying the questions. Note that this debrief-
ing happens before subjects know their final payout, so their answers are not affected by
potential feedback.11
11The complete experiment, in either document format or Qualtrics format, is available upon request.
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1.3.2 Treatments in Main Experiment
The experimental treatments apply to only the health insurance task. To minimize
confusion and spillovers across treatments, we use a between-subject design.12 Subjects
are randomized into 2×2×2 (high versus low incentive× no disclosure versus disclosure
× no education versus education) treatment cells summarized in table 1.3.1.
Table 1.3.1: Between-subject Treatment
No Education Education
Low Undisclosed LU0 LU1
Disclosed LD0 LD1
High Undisclosed HU0 HU1
Disclosed HD0 HD1
The health insurance task has three components corresponding to each treatment.
1. Incentive display: corresponds to disclosure treatment
2. Question: corresponds to incentive treatment
3. Accompanied materials: correspond to education treatment
As the question is the main component of the task, we explain this component first
and then show how the other two components support answering the questions. We vary
the incentives in the questions by changing the premiums of the plans while keeping the
scenario and all other features of the plans the same. Figure 1.3.3, highlights the monthly
premium row, the only difference across incentive levels. There are two reasons to focus
on altering premiums instead of other features to increase stakes. First, changing the pre-
mium maintains the structure of the questions: the “out-of-pocket costs” of the plans are
the same, both in the amount and the calculation method.13 In other words, the more
12It is confusing to have low and high-incentive questions alternate while it is hard to identify a clean
treatment effect for education availability in a within-subject design.
13The “out-of-pocket costs” refer to what a patient pays to use medical services outside of the premiums.
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complicated part of finding the total health costs, which requires subjects to compare the
health care needs with deductibles and co-payments or co-insurance, is the same across
the incentives. The treatments differ in the simpler part: which number needs to be multi-
plied by 12 to find the yearly price of health insurance. The second reason to use premiums
is that whenwe survey the plans in the market, plans across companies are often the same
in their features except for the premiums.14 As a result, we keep the same plan structure
in the market and vary only the premiums.
Figure 1.3.3: Incentive Treatment
(a) Low Incentive (b) High Incentive
Note that our design of the incentive treatment differs from the standard method of
manipulating incentives. In most decision experiments, incentives change because the ex-
change rate between experimental points and bonus changes (Johnson et al. (2013),Dewan
and Neligh (2017)). For instance, 1 point can be converted to either 1 cent or 2 cents, and
the 1-cent treatment is of low incentive. We use this exchange-rate method in our follow-
up experiment. However, in the main experiment, we vary the incentives by changing
the points of the plans and keeping the exchange rate constant because this is how plans
14There are also other non-monetary differences across companies, for example, in-network services, and
perhaps quality. These dimensions are outside the scope of the experiment.
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are presented in the real world. In real-life choices, “exchange rate” is always the same as
there is only one currency, but how much plans cost in that currency can change. When
that happens, subjects can figure out the incentives, but they may not do so. As a result,
the effects of incentives may be diminished because subjects do not know the stakes. By
mimicking incentives in real-world decisions, we can then ask if undisclosed stakes affect
choices less than disclosed stakes.
We alter the premiums such that in either incentive treatments, choosing a plan ran-
domly will earn subjects $2.25 on average. Under the low incentive, always choosing the
best plan gives subjects on average $3.50 while under the high incentive, the best plan on
average yields $7. The payment from the best plan in the high-incentive treatment doubles
that of the low-incentive treatment. Given the average wage on MTurk, this difference is a
considerable amount, warranting labeling the $7 treatment as “high incentive”.15
To vary disclosure, before the questions, we randomize subjects to see different screens
informing them of the incentive levels. Under no disclosure, subjects see the prior distri-
bution (50% chance they are in either treatment). Under disclosure, subjects see the spe-
cific incentive to which they have been assigned. Figure 1.3.4 shows the difference across
disclosure treatments conditional on the incentive level being low.
Figure 1.3.4: Disclosure Treatment, Conditional on Low Incentive
(a) Undisclosed Treatment (b) Disclosed Treatment
To vary available education, we randomize subjects to receive additional worked-out
examples in the materials at the end of each questions. Although all subjects have access
15Hara et al. (2018), which looks at the payment and time worked on HITs frommore than 2,000 workers,
finds that, on average, workers earn $2/hour. This low wage is due to a small number of “bad” requesters
who release a large number of lowly paid tasks. The average requesters paid $11/hour. Using these wage
rates, $3.50 is worth between 19 to 105 minutes of a worker’s time.
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to glossary definitions, we note that this information does not show subjects the process
of figuring out the right choice. In contrast, the examples show all the necessary steps
to solve problems similar to those subjects have to answer. In other words, we devise
deterministic health scenarios similar to those in the questions, and guide subjects on the
cost calculation for two sample health plans. These extra materials are accessible via a
series of buttons, so subjects can choose to use the examples or not.
1.3.3 Treatments in Follow-Up Experiment
In anticipating that our main experiment points to the conclusion that high-incentive
questions are easier, we describe how the follow-up experiment is designed to clarify the
effects of incentive. For a clearer explanation, we modify the names of the treatments in
the main experiment. Because incentives may have two parallel channels, encouraging
effort and reducing difficulty, the full name of “high incentive” should be “high-easy”,
and that of “low incentive” should be “low-hard”.
To disentangle the two channels, we introduce the “low-easy” treatments by scaling
the payments of the “high-easy” treatment. Specifically, the “low-easy” treatment has the
same questions as the “high-easy” treatment. With the same scenarios and the same plans,
the points of the plans, which are 10,000 minus the total health costs, are the same. To get
a “low” payment, the follow-up exchange rate is 1 point to 0.25 cents instead of 1 point to
1 cent in themain design. While this new exchange rate gives the desired “low” difference
between a randomly chosen plan and the best plan, itmakes the overall payment too small.
So, we also pay subjects a completion fee of $1.75, a payment they receive at the end of
the insurance task regardless of their choices. In other words, if we apply only the new
exchange rate, choosing randomly in the “easy” questions earns subjects $0.5 and always
choosing the best plan gives $1.75. Adding the completion fee of $1.75 results in $2.25 for
choosing randomly and $3.5 for always choosing the best plan, matching the low incentive
in the main design.
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As “low-easy” treatment pays the same as the “low-hard” treatment, comparing sub-
jects’ behaviors across these two treatments reveal the effects of easiness. To do so with or
without education, we include both the “low-easy-no education" and “low-easy-education”
treatments in the follow-up experiment. Besides, we include the “low-hard-no education”
(LD0) as the “linking treatment”, i.e., a treatment that appears in both the follow-up and
the main experiments, to serve as a basis to compare results across experiments. If sub-
jects from the linking group are similar across the two experiments, we can compare the
follow-up treatments and the main treatments to find the relative importance of difficulty.
Table 1.3.2 summarizes the three treatments in the follow-up experiment, all of which
have their counterparts in themain experiment. The linking group is the same as its coun-
terpart while the other two is derived from the counterparts via the new exchange rate.
Note that all follow-up treatments are disclosed and gives a “low” payment. This means
that all subjects see the screen in figure 1.3.4b stating that random choice yields $2.25 and
the lowest-cost plan yields $3.50 before the insurance questions.
Table 1.3.2: Between-Subject Treatment: Main vs. Follow-up
Follow-Up Main
Low-Hard-NoEdu (LD0) Low-Hard-NoEdu (LD0)
Low-Easy-NoEdu* High-Easy-NoEdu (HD0)
Low-Easy-Edu* High-Easy-Edu (HD1)
*: new exchange rate
In the follow-up experiment, subjects face the same environment as in the main exper-
iment: answering questions on Qualtrics accessed via Amazon MTurk. They go through
the same calculation task. When they reach the insurance task, one-third of the subjects
(the linking group) see the 1-to-1 exchange rate while two-thirds see the 1-to-0.25 ex-
change rate. Among the two-thirds, half receive extra educational materials.
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1.3.4 Measurement: Choice and Effort
Wemeasure choice by the number of questions subjects choose the best plan. To proxy
for overall effort, we use the amount of time subjects spent choosing insurance plans be-
cause careful decisions take time. To proxy for educational effort, we use the time lapse
between button clicks in the educational materials. We ignore the first click to minimize
capturing impulsive clicking. If subjects click on the second button, we consider the sub-
jects to have used the materials. We use the time taken between the second click and the
last click within the education section to measure education time. Since subjects can con-
tinue reading or processing the materials after the last click, we note that our measure is
the lower bound of the actual time spent on education. Besides, we recognize that time
misses effort intensity. Weprovide suggestive evidence that this is not a significant concern
in the results (section 1.4), and address this shortcoming more explicily in the follow-up
experiment.
In summary, we collect the following data for performance and effort:
• fi(·): the number of questions where subjects choose the best plan
• e∗i : the total time subjects spend on the insurance task
• e∗il: click data within the education section
We use the above data and apply the analysis from the framework in next section to
understand the effects of incentives and education in subjects’ behaviors.
1.4 Results: Main Experiment
All of the results in this section are from the main experiment described in section
1.3, although we interject with the results from the follow-up experiment in section 1.5
where appropriate. Before discussing the treatment effects, we give an overview of the
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subjects by providing descriptive statistics of their demographics and their performance
in the calculation task, which classifies them into types. We proceed to discuss the effects
of incentives, disclosure, and education availability. We wrap up with the heterogeneous
effects using the types defined by the calculation tasks and the types of mistakes subjects
make.
1.4.1 Description of Subjects
The main experiment collects 2,009 complete responses, which are distributed approx-
imately evenly across treatments. Each treatment has between 249 to 253 responses.16 On
average, subjects completed the experiment in 1,413 seconds (24 minutes), earning $0.7
from the calculation task and $2.6 from the insurance task (on top of the $2 participation
fee).
There are no obvious concerns about selection bias. First, we randomly assign subjects
into treatments. Second, we do not find attrition bias. Of the 123 incomplete responses,
90% abandon the experiment before the insurance task. The remaining 10% are present in
all treatments. Third, we check for demographic balance across the treatments by checking
for the treatment “effect” on the demographics, the result of which is in A.1. The only
significant difference is that subjects randomized into the high-incentive treatment are
less likely to have a health insurance plan, which is consistent with a 5% random chance
of finding a significant difference.
There are three differences in demographics between the sample and the US popula-
tion worth noting. 17 First, the sample is more educated, with 57% having a college degree
ormore, compared to 31% in theUSCensus. Second, they are younger: there are relatively
few workers beyond the age of 40. Third, more of the sample, 18%, do not have health in-
surance compared to the 9% in the population. The last two differences agree with our
16The appendix presents information on the number of subjects per treatment.
17Appendix A.1 presents the details of the subjects’ demographics as well as the number of subjects for
each treatment arm.
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prior of “gig workers” on an online platform. That the sample is relatively young possibly
explains their higher education level. Although the differences with the US population
are not essential to the study per se, it is useful to keep in mind that this sample is not
representative of the consumers, and our results are local to this population.
1.4.2 Calculation Task
We give an overview of the subjects’ performance on the task and then use their per-
formance to classify them into two types. On average, subjects spend 4.1 minutes on the
calculation questions, answering 1.94 questions correctly (out of 4). Although this per-
formance is significantly better than randomization, at 1 correct answer, recall that the
calculation task asks straightforward arithmetic questions, which subjects can complete
however they wish, without a time limit.18 So, even when subjects can answer the ques-
tions perfectly, the cost of doing so is non-trivial.
Figure 1.4.1 presents the distribution of subjects’ performance, which shows a fair
amount of heterogeneity. The distribution is spread out over all the possible number of
correct answers, from 0 to 4 possible correct answers. The vertical line, at 1.94, indicates
the average number of correct answers. As a simple classification of subjects, we label
those who answer more than 1 question correctly, corresponding to doing better than ran-
domly, as the “high type”, θh, and the rest as θl. In our data, this classification happens to
be a reasonably even split with 53% of subjects belonging to θh and 47% belonging to θl.
We use this classification to understand heterogeneous effects in the main task.
To provide a complete picture of the types, figure 1.4.2 presents the CDF of time θh
and θl spend in different components of the experiment. Note that all analysis for time
is done in logarithmic to correct for the heavy right tail in the time data.19 Figures 1.4.2a
and 1.4.2b show that θh generally spend more time to answer the questions in both tasks.
18Recall that there are four questions, and each question has four options. So randomization yields 1
correct answer.
19Appendix A.1 presents the QQ-plots to contrast the distributions of the level of time and logarithmic of
time. The logarithmic of time is closer to a normal distribution.
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Figure 1.4.1: Distribution of Subjects’ Performance in Calculation Task
Although that θl not spending time and not doing well may trigger the worry that they
are bots spamming MTurk, we do not think this is the case. Figure 1.4.2c shows that there
is no difference between the types in the time spent outside of the tasks, i.e., reading in-
structions. So, θl spend time to read instructions to understand the experiment, but when
the questions appear, they do not spend time and answer them poorly.
1.4.3 Insurance Task
We give an overview of the subjects’ performance before discussing the effects of in-
centives and education. On average, subjects spend 335 seconds (5.6 minutes) on the
insurance task, answering 1.6 questions correctly (out of five). There are variations in
performance: subjects in LU0 treatment have the worst performance with 1.43 correct an-
swers, and those in HD1 perform the best with 1.89. The performance in all treatments are
significantly better than 1.25, the average accuracy under randomization.20 33% of subjects
use the materials when they are available although they seem to spend a limited amount
of time, only about half a minute, looking at the materials.21 Appendix A.2.1 presents the
20Recall that there are five questions in the insurance task, each with four options. So, the average number
of correct answers under randomization is 1.25.
21The limited education time could be because our measure captures only the lower bound of time spent
reading the materials. In a small test conducted before the main experiment to check that the educational
materials can be understood, we recruit 30 workers to read the materials and answer ten comprehension
questions based on the materials. In this test, on average, subjects spend 2.5 minutes on the materials and
answer 7.3 questions correctly.
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Figure 1.4.2: Overall Time Spent in Components of the Experiment by Subjects’ Type
(a) CDF of lg(time) in Calculation Task (b) CDF of lg(time) in Insurance Task
(c) CDF of lg(time) in Non-Task
summary statistics broken down by treatment arms.
We analyze the effects of incentives and education by measuring the treatment effects
on effort and choices, as guided by the framework in section 1.2. The baseline specifi-
cation is equation 1.3. In all of our results, we control for all treatments but sometimes
suppress their coefficients for clearer exposition. On top of the baseline specification, we
add interaction terms where appropriate.
yi = β0 + β11{s = H}+ β21{d = D}+ β31{l = 1}+ εi (1.3)
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where
yi ∈ {fi(·), e∗i , e∗il}
1{s = H} = indicator for high incentives
1{d = D} = indicator for disclosure
1{l = 1} = indicator for available education
1.4.3.1 Effects of High Incentives
As analyzed in the framework in section 1.2, we start with the impact of incentives on
effort. Specifically, we focus on β1, the coefficient of 1{s = H}with yi being the time spent
on the task. Table 1.4.1 shows that high incentives have no effects on any of the three mea-
sures of effort, overall time, educational use, or educational time although the payment
from the best plan in the high-incentive treatment doubles that in the low-incentive treat-
ment. As it is surprising that subjects do not spendmore time on high-incentive questions,
we check whether our measure is reliable. Since subjects can finish the task however they
wish without any time limit, one concern is that the time measure may be too noisy to
detect any changes.22 However, we find that the correlation between the logarithm of time
and performance is 0.32, significant at 1%, so, the lack of effort response to incentives is
unlikely due to noise alone.
Table 1.4.2 then examines whether the lack of response of time is caused by subjects
not knowing how much their mistakes matter by looking at the coefficients on 1{s = H},
1{d = D} and their interaction. The null effect from the interaction indicates that this is not
the reason. Appendix A.2.2 shows figures of the CDFs of overall time spent to highlight
that the results are present in the entire distribution, and not just in the averages. From
22There is technically a time limit imposed on the MTurk interface: subjects have 3 hours between accept-
ing the task and submitting the completion code. However, if they need more than 3 hours, they can enter
their demographic information in theMTurk portal before 3 hours run out, andwematch their demographic
answers with the debriefing questions to pay them. All but five subjects completed the experiment within
3 hours.
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Table 1.4.1: Effects of Incentives on Effort
Lg(Time) EduUse Lg(EduTime)
High Incentive 0.0270 0.0167 -0.0993
(0.0504) (0.0296) (0.137)
Constant 5.067∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 3.765∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0250) (0.130)
Observations 2009 1003 326
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure and education treatments.
Table 1.4.2: Effects of Incentives and Disclosure on Effort
Lg(Time) EduUse Lg(EduTime)
High Incentive 0.0114 0.0456 -0.248
(0.0707) (0.0412) (0.202)
Disclosure -0.0529 0.0709∗ -0.165
(0.0712) (0.0416) (0.207)
High Incentive x Discl 0.0312 -0.0576 0.279
(0.101) (0.0592) (0.274)
Constant 5.075∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 3.845∗∗∗
(0.0550) (0.0285) (0.158)
Observations 2009 1003 326
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the education treatment.
the analysis in section 1.2, we, thus, conclude that subjects perceive the return to efforts to
be small.
We note here that table 1.4.2 shows that disclosure seems to affect educational usage
when incentives are low. However, this occurs without an increase in educational time.
Since educational use is defined as whether subjects access the materials, we attribute this
effect to noises in subjects impulsively clicking the button.
Despite subjects not spending more time on high-incentive questions, they do better.
Table 1.4.3 show that they answer more questions correctly, regardless of disclosure. The
point estimates in the specifications with and without the interaction between disclosure
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Table 1.4.3: Effects of Incentive and Disclosure on Performance
Number of Correct Ans









Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the education treatment.
and incentives are roughly the same. Subjects answer 0.27 questions more correctly in
high-incentive questions, from an average of 1.36 correct answers in the low-incentive
ones. Two hypotheses can explain this effect: effort intensity or easier choices. Within
the same amount of time, subjects can be more alert and pay more attention. At the same
time, since higher stakes make the total health costs further apart, they canmake the prob-
lems simpler.
As we cannot fully disentangle the two hypotheses in the main experiment, we use
the follow-up experiment to separate the channels. While the follow-up results in section
1.5 clarifies that high-incentive questions are easier, there is evidence in the main design
which already hints that effort intensity is not the key reason because effort intensity can
rationalize the results only under the disclosed treatments. In the undisclosed treatment,
subjects increase effort intensity only if they know the stakes. However, their answers to
our debriefing question suggest that they do not know the stakes. Table 1.4.4 tabulates
the percentage of subjects choosing each available answer when they are asked what they
think is the payment for the best plan. The majority of subjects in the disclosed treatments
answer correctly, while the majority of subjects in the undisclosed treatments pick the
34
prior. This table does not show the split across education availability, but the result, in
appendix A.2.2, is the same. As a result, effort intensity may not justify the impact of
incentives for undisclosed incentives.
Table 1.4.4: Incentive Perception - % of Subjects by Their Answers
Undisclosed Disclosed
Low High Low High
$2.25 7.8 7.6 15.7 11.0
$3.5 11.2 11.8 76.7 9.8
$7 4.4 5.2 5.4 75.1
Prior: (50%: $3.5, 50%: $7) 76.7 75.5 2.2 4.2
Total 100 100 100 100
Q: If you always choose the lowest-cost plan, what do you think
you earn? Correct Answer for L: $3.50, for H: $7
In summary, the framework in section 1.2 suggests that incentives work either by in-
creasing effort or reducing difficulty. Our data finds no evidence for the former channel,
but finds evidence for the latter. The follow-up experiment confirms this finding, which
is surprising and unexplored in the literature. We now examine the impact of available
education and then how the channels of incentives may interact with education.
1.4.3.2 Effects of Providing Education
Similar to the previous section, we first look at the effects of incentives on effort and
then on choices. With 32% of subjects using the education materials, table 1.4.5, which
focuses the coefficients on 1{l = 1}, 1{s = H}, and their interaction, shows that providing
educationmaterials increases overall time spent bymore than 20%, suggesting that study-
ing the materials does not fully substitute time spent on other methods which may have
otherwise been used (for example, asking someone for help). The table also shows that
the interaction between education and incentives has no effect on time spent: subjects in
low-incentive treatment spend as much time as those in high-incentive treatment. Since
low incentives could not havemotivated subjects in the low-incentive treatment, their edu-
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cational effort must have been caused by task difficulty. Although we cannot disentangle
the causes for educational effort for the high-incentive treatment, the follow-up experi-
ment shows that incentives, not ease, encourage educational effort.




High Incentive 0.0270 -0.00792
(0.0504) (0.0700)





Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure treatment.
Since subjects increase effort equally for both incentive levels, i.e., for both “low-hard”
and “high-easy” problems, the interaction between education and incentives on choices
measures the education effectiveness on different difficulty levels. Table 1.4.6 shows that
education is ineffective for hard problems despite subjects’ educational effort, but edu-
cation is effective for easy problems, increasing the number of correct answers by 0.21
questions. The pooled effect of education is positive at 0.146. Appendix A.2.3 shows the
CDFs of performance and time spent to confirm that the results on the interaction are not
confined to averages but are present in the entire distribution.
To provide a complete picture of the effects of available education, we show suggestive
evidence on the selection into education. First, the correlation between the logarithm of
calculation time and education time is 0.3, significant at 1%.23 Second, if we assume that
those not using education behave “as if” the materials are absent, comparing their time
23The correlation between calculation performance and education time is 0.24, significant at 1%. This
result is consistent with the evidence that those who do better in the calculation task spend more time.
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High Incentive 0.273∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0685)





Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure treatment.
with time by all subjects under unavailable education further clarifies the selection. In
other words, if we assume that the presence of education does not change the behavior of
those not using education, the difference in time comes from those who would have used
education if it were available. Figure 1.4.3 agrees with the first piece of evidence: those
who already put in effort use education more. The difference in the mean log(time) is
0.154, significant at 1%. Education availability reinforces willingness to spend efforts.
Figure 1.4.3: Overall Time - (Edu, No Use) versus No Edu
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1.4.3.3 Heterogeneous Effects
After analyzing the treatment effects on the entire subject pool, we now look at the
heterogeneous effects across the types categorized by the calculation task.
Similar to the difference in the calculation task, in the insurance task, θh’s continue
to spend more time and do better than θl’s. We add an indicator for θh to the baseline
specification 1.3 and show the differences between the types in 1.4.7. Moreover, figure
1.4.4 reiterates the selection into education: the high type is significantly more likely to
use education.











Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure treatment.
Table 1.4.8 shows the heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the indicator for
θh with that for high incentive and available education. Under high incentives, θh’s do
better, but the difference in time is insignificant. In other words, θh’s effort response to a
high incentive is not different from that of θl’s, but the baseline longer time spent allows
θh’s to take better advantage of the easier questions.
When education is available, θh’s neither spend more time nor make better choices.
However, note that the coefficient on “education” for performance, which indicates the
effect for θl, is now insignificant and is close to 0. Meanwhile, the point estimate for the
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Figure 1.4.4: Difference Between Types in Education Use
interaction term, 0.125, is close to the overall effect of available education, 0.139, in table
1.4.7.24 As a result, the statistically insignificant difference in performance is likely due to
the lack of power, but we conclude that there is no difference in the educational benefit to
the types.
Appendix A.2.4 shows the regression results with the full interaction between θh, in-
centive, and education. Here, we lack statistical power. The only significant difference
that survives is the baseline difference between the types, the effect of incentive (alone)
on performance, and the effect of available education (alone) on time spent.
1.4.3.4 Subjects’ Mistakes
This section provides evidence of subjects’ different sensitivities to cost components of
the plans, premiums and “out-of-pocket” costs. We first explain how we use our data to
tease out subjects’ responses to the components and then present results of our estimates.
Our data set contains two essential details of subject-level choices: the entire menu of
plans and the cost components of the plans. In other words, for each subject, we know
the plans they choose and the plans they do not choose. Moreover, because we know the
health scenarios attached to the plans, we know the premiums and the deterministic “out-
of-pocket” costs of using medical services for each plan. As a result, we can find subjects’
24The sum of the coefficient on “education” and “education ×θh” is significantly positive.
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Table 1.4.8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Incentive Education
Ans Lg(Time) Ans Lg(Time)
θh 0.297∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0662)
High Incentive 0.183∗∗ -0.0413 0.274∗∗∗ 0.0297
(0.0615) (0.0627) (0.0499) (0.0473)
Education 0.141∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0728 0.121∗
(0.0498) (0.0473) (0.0616) (0.0627)
High Incentive x θh 0.171∗ 0.132
(0.0985) (0.0940)
Edu x θh 0.125 0.154
(0.0986) (0.0939)
Constant 1.215∗∗∗ 4.702∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗ 4.706∗∗∗
(0.0551) (0.0544) (0.0553) (0.0549)
Observations 2009 2009 2009 2009
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure treatment.
sensitivity to the cost components using a linear probability model specified in equation
(1.4.)
yijk = γ0 + γ1Premiumjk + γ2OOPjk +
∑
k γ3k1k
+γ1sPremiumjk × 1{s = H}+ γ2sOOPjk × 1{s = H}





1 if subject i chooses plan j in scenario k
0 otherwise
Premiumjk = annual premium of plan j in scenario k
OOPjk = out-of-pocket cost of plan j in scenario k
1k = indicator for scenario k
Table 1.4.9 shows the resultswith standard errors clustered at the subject level. The first
column ignores the interactions with the treatment assignments while the rest check the
treatment effects on the sensitivities. Overall, subjects respond to cost increase: an increase
in either the premium or the out-of-pocket costs reduces the likelihood of choosing the
plan, which reflects subjects’ understanding of insurance. However, the response differs
between cost components: subjects put more weight on premiums. The coefficients on
premiums and “out-of-pocket” costs in the first column are different from each other at
1% statistical significance. Since premiums are much easier to perceive, it is reasonable
that people are more responsive to this component. However, note that this is a “mistake”
because in principle, subjects should be equally sensitive to the components. Our evidence
is similar to observations documented in the literature (Johnson et al. (2013),Abaluck and
Gruber (2011)).
Increasing the incentives via the premiums do not change either weight. Meanwhile,
available education increases subjects’ responses to both components although the in-
crease is higher for premiums. The differential education effect on the components is
surprising because a priori, given that premium is a relatively straightforward concept,
we do not expect education to affect the weight attached to the premium. The evidence,
thus, reinforces the earlier conclusion that available education is more effective on easier
problems.
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Table 1.4.9: Sensitivity to Cost Components
1Choose Plan
Premium -0.00219∗∗∗ -0.00262∗∗∗ -0.00161∗∗∗
(0.000182) (0.000381) (0.000235)
OOP -0.000319∗∗∗ -0.000359∗∗∗ -0.000272∗∗∗
(0.0000148) (0.0000309) (0.0000194)
Premium x High 0.000492
(0.000428)
OOP x High 0.0000514
(0.0000345)
Premium x Edu -0.00116∗∗
(0.000356)
OOP x Edu -0.0000932∗∗
(0.0000288)
Observations 40180 40180 40180
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
In summary, our main experiment suggests that incentive works because it makes the
questions easier, which is a surprising channel. We also find although subjects are willing
to put in the educational effortwhen the problems are hard but providing educationworks
only under high-incentive or easy problems. On other results, we find that the difference
between the types from the calculation task persists in the insurance task. Subjects also
place more weights on premiums relative to “out-of-pocket” costs.
1.5 Results: Follow-up Experiment
The follow-up experiment is designed to clarify the effects of incentives and education
detected in the main experiment. We start the follow-up results with a brief overview of
the responses. We then provide evidence that subjects in the follow-up experiment are
similar to those in the main experiment. This similarity allows us to pool the follow-up
treatments with the main treatments for the analysis. Using the pooled data, we answer
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two questions from the main experiment. First, do high incentives make choices easier?
Second, does ease or high incentive motivates educational effort?
There are 603 collected responses for the follow-up experiment, with 201 subjects in
each treatment. On average, subjects completed the experiment in 1,291 seconds (22 min-
utes), earning $0.68 from the calculation task and $2.45 from the insurance task.
Across our measures of choice and effort, subjects from the follow-up experiment are
not statistically different from those in the main experiment. Figure 1.5.1 shows that the
follow-up subjects’ performance in the calculation task is perceptibly indistinguishable
from that in the main experiment. Here, the distribution is similarly spread out from 0 to
4 with 49% belonging to θl and 51% belong to θh.
Figure 1.5.1: Distribution of Performance in Calculation Task (Follow-Up)
Table 1.5.1, using an indicator for subjects from the follow-up experiment, provides
further evidence that the two groups of subjects are similar. Overall, they are not different
in their calculation performance. The linking treatment, LD0, is similar across two exper-
iments in performance and time spent in the insurance task. Moreover, when education
is available, 36% of subjects in the follow-up experiment use the materials, comparable to
the 33% in the main experiment.
Given the similarity, we now pool the treatments from both experiments. Table 1.5.2,
using an indicator variable for easy questions, show the effects of easiness with or without
education. Without education, subjects in the “low-easy” treatment does better without
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Table 1.5.1: Subjects in Main Experiments vs Subjects in Follow-Up Experiments
All LD0
Calc Ans Ins Ans Ins Lg(Time)
Follow-Up -0.0333 -0.0447 -0.0401
(0.0656) (0.0914) (0.101)
Constant 1.944∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗ 5.026∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0627) (0.0714)
Observations 2612 454 454
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
spending more time than those in the “low-hard” treatment. Meanwhile, with education,
subjects in the “low-easy” treatment spend less time, and yet, do as well as those in the
“low-hard” treatment. In either cases, the performance given an amount of time is higher
for “low-easy” treatments, confirming that high-incentive questions are easier.
Table 1.5.2: Effects of Easiness
Low, Easy-Hard
No Edu Edu
Ans Lg(Time) Ans Lg(Time)
Easy 0.289∗∗ -0.0964 0.0661 -0.247∗∗
(0.0958) (0.0912) (0.104) (0.109)
Constant 1.423∗∗∗ 5.008∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗ 5.234∗∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0509) (0.0657) (0.0716)
Observations 655 655 451 451
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
We now turn to the second question from the main experiment in table 1.5.3 which
looks at the effects of providing education on “low-easy” subjects. When incentives are
low and the problems are easy, subjects neither increase time nor performance. This sug-
gests that when the problems are easy, removing the high incentive removes the motiva-
tion to put in the effort, which then explains the ineffectiveness of education. Table 1.5.4
provides further evidence of the effects of incentiveswhen education is available andprob-
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lems are easy. In this case, high incentives encourage educational effort, which, in turn,
explains the effect of providing education on choices.







Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 1.5.4: Incentives Complement Education for Easy Questions
Easy,Edu,High-Low
Ans Lg(Time) EduUse Lg(EduTime)
High Incentive 0.307∗∗ 0.309∗∗ -0.0233 0.568∗∗
(0.116) (0.109) (0.0452) (0.187)
Constant 1.582∗∗∗ 4.987∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 3.143∗∗∗
(0.0805) (0.0824) (0.0340) (0.136)
Observations 454 454 454 159
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Recall that in themain experiment, we find that subjects arewilling to put in the educa-
tional effort in the “low-hard” treatment. In contrast, we find in the follow-up experiment
that they are not willing to do so for “low-easy” treatment. So, conditional on a low incen-
tive, subjects perceive the returns of education to be higher for hard problems. However,
the main experiment shows that this perception is wrong: subjects put in the same time
for hard and easy problems but they improve performance only for easy problems. We
leave the task of understanding why subjects have the wrong perception to later research.
In summary, the follow-up experiment confirms that difficulty is critical in explaining




This paper is related to a number of strands of literature. We discuss them from the
specific literature on health insurance to the broadest literature on the effects of incentives
in experiments.
The relatively recent attention ofUSpolicy-makers onhealth insurance has beenmatched
with a number of studies using US data, which generally show that consumers are not
choosing the financially optimal plan. Abaluck and Gruber (2011, 2016); Bhargava et al.
(2015) use individual choices (under Medicare Part D for the first two papers, employer-
sponsored health insurance for the third paper) to show that consumers can save a sig-
nificant amount of money by making a different choice. Moreover, Abaluck and Gru-
ber (2016), which follow up on Abaluck and Gruber (2011), reveals that consumers do
not make better choices over time. Besides these observational studies on poor choices,
Loewenstein et al. (2013) presents evidence that consumers have little understanding of
health insurance.
There are a few experimental papers trying to understand health insurance choices.
Kling et al. (2012) uses a field experiment to measure the frictions in comparing insurance
plans. Other papers have used hypothetical health choices (Johnson et al. (2013); Bhar-
gava et al. (2015)). While our design is closest to that of Johnson et al. (2013), none of
the existing papers manipulate incentives by changing the features of the plans or study
the effects of incentives on effort and the interaction between incentives and education.
By manipulating incentives via the premiums, our paper shows that high incentives do
not affect effort, but they still matter by reducing difficulty. We also find an interaction
between incentives and education on improving choices.
Bhargava et al. (2015) is the only paper we know that look directly at the effect of edu-
cation on health insurance choices. Although their education treatment improves choices,
this treatment is confounded by a comprehension test. Specifically, subjects who receive
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education are given a comprehension test before their choices while subjects who do not
receive education are given the test after their choices. Besides, their experiments are not
incentivized. In contrast, our experiment does not ask subjects for their understanding of
the concepts before they choose a plan. We also use an incentivized setting which allows
to study the interaction between education and incentives.
Moving beyond health insurance, our paper is nested within the disclosure and fi-
nancial education literature. Existing papers disclose incentives by translating financial
concepts (for instance, interest rate in the context of borrowing and saving) into dollar
amounts (Bertrand andMorse (2011); Goda et al. (2014)). Wedisclose incentives by show-
ing the dollar difference between the best option and a randomly chosen option. On finan-
cial education, there have been enough studies to prompt a meta-analysis by Fernandes
et al. (2014). However, they have said little about the factors contributing the education ef-
fectiveness besides the field experiments byDrexler et al. (2014) andCarpena et al. (2017).
As field experiments are limited by their ability to vary the choices, our experiment using
hypothetical plans shed lights on how differences in the environment, such as premium
change, can complement education.
On the broadest literature on the effects of incentives, there have been many experi-
ments from the laboratory to the field on the effects of incentives (Camerer and Hoga-
rth (1999), Gneezy et al. (2011)). The results are mixed and dependent on the types of
tasks subjects complete. Our experiment contributes to this literature using a hypothetical
choice which mimics a real-life choice and shows that incentives may matter by making
choices easier.
1.7 Conclusion
Motivated by the poor choices in consumer finance even though stakes are high and
education is freely available as documented by literature, this project implements an ex-
periment on MTurk to study the effects of incentives and education on behaviors. We use
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the health insurance setting and vary stakes underlying the decisions, information about
the stakes via disclosure, and access to education. To pin down the mechanisms of incen-
tives and education, we measure both choices of insurance plans and time spent in the
task.
There are three main findings of the experiment. First, high incentives have a sur-
prising alternative channel in making the problems simpler. Second, subjects perceive
education to be beneficial in either hard problems or high-stakes environment. Third, the
actual return of education is positive for easy problems but zero for hard problems. The
combination of the last two findings suggests that in financial choices, people could be en-
couraged to use education when stakes are high, but policy-makers should aim to reduce
the difficulty of the problems so that the educational effort translates to better choices.
Overall, even with our full intervention of high incentives and available education, the
average performance is still poor. Subjects answer fewer than half the number of questions
correctly. As a result, there is much space for future research to understand choices and
explore potential solutions.
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Chapter 2: Easiness, Incentives, and Education
in Financial Choices 1
2.1 Introduction
Recognizing that there are many decisions where people make mistakes, a growing
strand of literature has been exploring ways to simplify choices through choice architec-
ture (Thaler et al. (2013)). Researchers have considered various methods such as default
options (Beshears et al. (2009)), choice set reduction (Johnson et al. (2013)), or alternative
information display (Bertrand and Morse (2011),Chetty et al. (2009),Goda et al. (2014)).
One channel which has, so far, been ignored is that high incentives may also simplify
choices. When incentives are higher, options are further apart, which may, in turn, make
it easier to tell a good option from a bad one.
There are two observations regarding this potential “easiness” channel of incentives.
First, “easiness” is distinct from random noises in the style of random utility. In random
utility, when utilities are further apart, subjects choose lower-utility options less frequently
because large noises, enough to overcome the difference in utilities, are rarer. “Easiness”,
in contrast, is about the spread in options that is payoff-irrelevant. Second, “easiness” is also
distinct from standard thinking costs. Standard thinking costs are responsive to incentives:
when incentives are lower, people pay less attention, and hence, make worse choices. In
“easiness”, when incentives are lower, people exert the same effort and still make worse
choices.
To see the above distinction, consider posted prices in stores. First, Chetty et al. (2009)
1I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-1919483)
for this project.
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shows that increasing the spread of observed prices by posting taxes instead of adding
them only at the counter can affect choices despite being payoff-irrelevant. Second, a
model of thinking costs, in this context, will predict that as prices increase, more effort
will go to calculating taxes, which, in turn, diminishes the effect of posting taxes. In con-
trast, “easiness” predicts no increase in the effort; the effect of posting taxes will be the
same. Given its potential impact on decisions, it is essential to understand whether and
how this “easiness” channel may affect behavior.
A key challeng with studying “easiness” is disentangling the channel from the usual
incentives. As a step in addressing this challenge, this project uses an experiment to make
the channels orthogonal to each other. The experiment uses choices between back-dated
savings accounts. Since the underestimation of compound interest rates has been widely
documented (Stango and Zinman (2009a)), this task provides a setting that is rife with
mistakes, and hence, gives us the leeway to study the effects of “easiness”. At the same
time, back-dating allows us to abstract from time preference, and thus, focus on objectively
defined “mistakes”. We recruit Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers to choose the
accounts with the highest amounts of money at the time of the experiment. Within this
task, we vary easiness and incentives independently to understand their effects on choices
and time spent. Because we use a consumer-finance task, we also add an education treat-
ment to look at the interaction of these channels with financial education, a topic of much
interest due to widespread consumers’ low financial literacy (Lin et al. (2019)).
To increase “easiness”, we increase the variance of the initial deposits in the accounts,
thus, increasing the variance of the final amounts. We find that doing so indeed makes
choices easier by two sets of evidence. First, subjects assigned to the high-variance treat-
ment do better without spending more time. The number of correct answers increases by
30%, and the effect can be detected at the question level and not just the aggregate level.
Second, when we invite subjects back to a repeat experiment in which the variance is mid-
way between the high and low-variance versions, subjects in the high-variance treatment
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previously do worse relative to their past performance. The effects of variance on easiness
are, thus, robust in both between-subject and within-subject analyses.
To increase incentives, we pay subjects a higher piece rate per correct answer. While
we recover the usual effects of incentives, where subjects spend more time and do better
under high incentives, we find no significant interaction between incentives and easiness.
This evidence suggests that these two channels are independent of each other.
Next, we identify the effect of education by randomizing the availability of materials
on compound interest rates. On average, subjects do better when educational materials
are available. Moreover, both easiness and incentives complement education. Subjects
assigned to the “easy” treatment spend less time studying, yet, do as well as those in the
“difficult” treatment. At the same, subjects assigned to the high-incentive treatment spend
the same amount of time on the materials but have a greater improvement in choices. Our
results suggest that complementing financial education with these additional channels
may enhance its effectiveness.
Additionally, we find suggestive evidence that subjects assigned to the education treat-
ment retain knowledge in the repeat experiment, although the improvement in outcomes
is mixed. On heterogeneous effects, we find that low types, who have lower financial lit-
eracy scores, benefit more from the easiness treatment while there is little heterogeneity
in other treatments.
In summary,wefind evidence that payoff-irrelevant spread in options canmake choices
easier and improve decisions. This channel is distinct from the usual incentives channel.
We also show that both channels can complement financial education to make it more
effective.
That further-apart options are more distinguishable is a robust finding in perceptual
tasks in psychology. Economists have started using this fact to formulate costs of attention
and testing them in experiments (Caplin et al. (2018),Woodford (2012)). To the best of
our knowledge, this paper and Huynh (2019), chapter 1 of this thesis, are the first to doc-
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ument this channel in settings mimicking everyday consumer decisions. We show that
even when subjects may have a perfect score using calculation and education, the chan-
nel survives. While this paper shows that “easiness” and incentives are distinct from each
other, Huynh (2019) finds that “easiness” may even dominate incentives. Besides, we also
contribute the burgeoning experimental literature on financial education (Ambuehl et al.
(2014),Fernandes et al. (2014)).
For the remaining of this paper, section 2.2 describes our experiment, including the
treatments and the repeat experiment. Section 2.3 then presents our results. Section 2.4
provides an overview of the literature and we conclude in section 2.5.
2.2 Experimental Design
We describe the experimental design in this section, starting with the basic set-up and
tasks. Thenwe explain the treatments in part 1 and how they aim to understand the effects
of easiness and incentives. After that, we describe part 2, the repeat experiment, and the
questions it addresses. We wrap up with the implementation details of the experiment.
2.2.1 Set-up and Tasks
The experiment has two parts, spaced two weeks apart. All treatments are restricted
to part 1. Part 2 does not have any treatments. In both parts, subjects have to finish two
tasks: financial literacy in task 1 and savings choice in task 2. These tasks focus on the
compound interest rate, a central concept in borrowing and saving products. We describe
the tasks in turn.
Tasks 1 consists of financial literacy questions that benchmark subjects’ knowledge
against existing measures. We also use the literacy score to measure heterogeneous treat-
ment effects. All five financial literacy questions are listed below with the correct answers
in bold. We take L1 from the OECD Financial Literacy survey (OECD (2017)), L2-3 from
the National Financial Capability Study (Lin et al. (2019)), and L4-5 from Ambuehl et al.
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(2014). While L1-3 has been administered to the general public by the OECD and the
FINRA Foundation, and thus, provide a good benchmark, L4-5 test deeper understand-
ing of compound interests. By adding L4-5, we aim to identify those who may not benefit
from our education, thus, help us understand the mechanism of our treatment. The ques-
tions are presented to subjects in the order shown, from the easiest to the hardest question.
2.2.1.0.1 Financial Literacy Sample Questions
L1 Suppose you put $100 into a savings account earning 2% per year compounded
yearly. After one year, how much would you have in the account?
A: Open Response ($102), Don’t know
L2 Suppose you have $100 in a savings account earning 2% interest a year compounded
yearly. After five years, how much would you have?
A:More than $102, Exactly $102, Less than $102, Don’t know
L3 Suppose you owe $1,000 on loan, and the interest rate you are charged is 20% per
year compounded annually. If you did not pay anything off, at this interest rate,
how many years would it take for the amount you owe to double?
A: Less than 2 years, 2 to 4 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 or more years, Don’t know
L4 If the interest rate is 7% per year compounded yearly, about how long does it take
until a savings account has grown by a factor of four (i.e., is four times as large as it
was originally)?
A: About 5 years, About 10 years, About 15 years, About 20 years, About 25 years,
About 30 years, About 35 years, About 40 years, Don’t know
L5 If somebody tells you an investment should double in four years, what rate of return
(per year, compounded yearly) is he promising?
A: 15%, 16%, 17%, 18%, 19%2, 20%, Don’t know
2The correct answer is between 18% and 19%. So we accept both 18% and 19% as correct.
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After the literacy questions, in task 2, subjects are asked to choose one among four
back-dated savings accounts, a sample of which is in figure 2.2.1. Our design of back-
dated accounts differs from the usual method that uses choices between future amounts
of money. Because in real life, interest rates apply to future payouts, it is natural to mimic
such settings to measure subjects’ evaluation of compound interests. However, doing so
necessarily entails time preference, which rules out having objectively correct answers. For
example, if subjects have to choose between $10 saved for 1week at 1%weekly interest and
$10 saved for 2 weeks at 0.5% weekly interest, we cannot tell which choice is correct.3
Figure 2.2.1: Savings Account Sample Question
In contrast, back-dated accounts abstract from time preference because all options ma-
ture at the time of the experiment. This allows us to define correct answers as those with
the greatest amount of money at the time of the experiment. For example, in figure 2.2.1,
the correct answer is B.4 Give that our objective is measuring subjects’ understanding of
interest rates, and not their time preference, back-dating minimizes this confound.
Because the most natural mistake for this task is using simple, instead of compound,
interest rates, we design all but 1 question such that subjects cannot get the correct answer
with simple interest rates.5 For example, in figure 2.2.1, if subjects use simple interest,
3In a related study on education of compound interest rates, Ambuehl et al. (2014) gets around time
preference by measuring time preference.
4B is correct regardless of whether subjects use the Rule of 72, the topic of the education treatment, or
the exact compounding using exponential. This is the case for all questions.
5We randomize the correct answers such as that all of A, B, C, D may be correct. Most of the time, A is
the account with the greatest initial deposit. At the same time, simple interest always favors the greatest
initial deposit. Randomization of the correct answers, then, inevitably results in one question having the
same answer regardless of simple or compound interests.
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they will arrive at C, which is incorrect.6 There are two possible reasons for choosing
simple-interest answers. First, subjects apply simple interest rates. Second, subjects do
not apply simple interest but make random calculation errors. As such, in our analysis,
we include the treatment effects on the number of questions in which subjects choose the
simple-interest accounts to understand the contribution of the above reasons. For instance,
if easiness does not affect the number of simple-interest answers, this suggests that the first
reason is dominant.
There are 6 questions in task 2, presented in random order. Following Ambuehl et al.
(2014), we set the maturity horizon at either 72 months or 36 months. This eases the
application of the Rule of 72, the topic of the educational materials. For example, when
the maturity horizon is 72 months, the monthly interest rate corresponds to the number
of doublings. If the interest rate is 2%, the initial deposit has doubled twice. We also use
their interest rates, which make the calculation more straightforward.
In each of task 1 and task 2, we randomly select 2 questions and pay subjects a piece
rate per correct answer. For task 1, the rate is $0.10 per correct answer. For task 2, the rate
depends on the incentive treatment.
After the tasks, we ask subjects the methods they use to choose the savings accounts
and demographic questions. The self-reported methods give us more evidence on how
subjects make decisions. We measure both choices and time spent in the questions as
outcomes to test our hypotheses.
2.2.2 Treatments and Analysis Plan in Part 1
To minimize confusion and spillovers across treatments, we use a between-subject de-
sign. Subjects are randomized into 2 × 2 × 2 (high versus low incentive × easy versus
difficult questions × no education versus education) treatment cells summarized in table
2.2.1. It is more accurate to describe the “easy” questions as the “high-variance” ques-
6The details of all questions in the savings account task are in appendix B.5.
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Figure 2.2.2: Easiness Treatment
(a) A Sample of Difficult Questions (b) A Sample of Easy Questions
tions, but, in anticipating our results, we use the words “easy” and “difficult” to make our
expositions more concise.
Table 2.2.1: Between-subject Treatment
No Education Education
Low Easy LE0 LE1Difficult LD0 LD1
High Easy HE0 HE1Difficult HD0 HD1
For the easiness variation, we increase the variance of the amounts in the savings ac-
counts, as illustrated by figure 2.2.2. On the left is the same question in figure 2.2.1, which
is the difficult version. On the right is the easy version in which we change the deposits
such that the variance increases.7 In this way, the accounts are further apart, potentially
making it simpler for subjects to identify the correct choice. The average standard devia-
tion of the final amounts across questions in the difficult version is $295, and in the easy
version is $629.
Note that the easy and difficult versions have the same structure. We keep thematurity
horizons and interest rates the same. Moreover, the correct answers are the same in both
versions. In figure 2.2.2, both of the correct answers are B.8 As a result, if easiness indeed
affects choices, the mechanism is limited to subjects making fewer calculation mistakes,
and not, say, more realistic interest rates and maturity.
7All versions, including those used in part 2, are provided in appendix B.5.
8If subjects use simple interest, the answers are also the same in both versions.
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For education, subjects are randomized to receive information on the Rule of 72, which
is a heuristic to calculate compound interest rates. This heuristic is easy to explain and
understand and does not require knowledge on exponential. Ambuehl et al. (2014) also
uses this heuristic in their study. We use the explanation of the Rule of 72 provided by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.9 10 Besides, we add two examples to illustrate
how to use this Rule in a situation similar to our questions.
For subjects without education, they receive a definition of compound interest, which
is from the same website of the U.S. Commission. Figure 2.2.3 shows the screenshot of
the education treatment. Subjects can access education via a button, which allows us to
measure whether and how much time subjects use educational materials.
Figure 2.2.3: Education Treatment
(a) No Education (b) Education
To vary incentives conditional on the same difficulty level, we change the piece rate
per correct answer. Recall that 2 questions are randomly selected for payment. For low
incentives, subjects receive $0.5 per correct answer. For high incentives, subjects receive
$2 per correct answer.
9“What is compound interest?”. Retrieved from investor.gov
10There are other variations of this Rule, such as Rule of 69 or 70. We use Rule of 72 following the U.S.
Commission.
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Using the above treatments, we aim to understand the treatment effects of the higher
variance of accounts, named here as “easiness”, increasing incentives, and available ed-
ucation on both choices and time spent. Moreover, we want to look at the interaction
between these treatments to understand whether they may complement or substitute one
another.
2.2.3 Design and Analysis Plan of Part 2
Part 2, which happens two weeks after part 1, has the same two tasks but does not
have any treatments. First, we repeat task 1 with the same questions and format to check
if there are treatment effects on subjects’ literacy scores. Similar to part 1, 2 questions are
randomly selected in task 1 for payment, and subjects are paid $0.1 per correct answer.
Second, there are no treatments in task 2. Incentives, difficulty level, and education
are the same across all subjects. For education, we remove all information on compound
interest rates, including the definition. Because we want to test for lagged effects from
past education treatment, we avoid having some information more easily retrieved than
others. As a result, no information on compound interests is available.
For difficulty level, the standard deviation of the final amounts is $463, between the
standard deviations of the difficult and easy versions in part 1. The structure of the back-
dated accounts remains the same. For incentives, 2 questions are randomly selected for
payment, and the piece rate is $1 per correct answer, between the high and low incentives
in part 1.
The obvious set of questions wewant to ask is whether past treatments have any effects
on part 2 behaviors. Intuitively, we expect past easiness and incentives not to have any
effects in part 2. However, past education may affect behaviors if subjects retain what they
have learned.
The more subtle set of questions is whether past treatments have any effects on the
difference in behaviors between parts 1 and 2. Because the difficulty and incentives levels
58
in part 2 are between the levels in part 1, if the effects of easiness and incentives are robust,
we may see that the reverse effect on the difference between part 1 and 2. Specifically,
questions in part 2 are harder than the easy version in part 1. Hence, we expect subjects
assigned to the easy treatment to do worse in part 2 compared to part 1. Similarly, the
piece rate in part 2 is lower than that in the high-incentive treatment in part 1. Subjects
assigned to high-incentive treatment may then exert less effort and do worse in part 2.
2.2.4 Implementation
We recruit subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to complete our experi-
ment through the Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Before starting part 1, subjects pro-
vide consent for being contacted for part 2, via either MTurk portal or email. They can
choose how they would like to be contacted.
For part 1, subjects receive a participation fee of $1. To incentivize subjects to return
for part 2, we increase the participation fee for part 2 to $2. Subjects also receive “bonus
payment” for both parts, which is the piece rate payment for answering the questions cor-
rectly, as described above. The random selection of questions for payment is independent
across the two parts.
To minimize attrition bias in part 2, we reveal and pay the bonus payment for part 1
only after part 2. In this way, there is no feedback before part 2. To put it more concretely,
in part 1, we pay subjects only the $1 participation fee. After two weeks, we invite them
to part 2. Those who participate in part 2 receive the $2 participation fee. Then, finally,
bonus payments for both parts are paid.11 Subjects are informed and provide consent to
this payment scheme before part 1.
Figure 2.2.4 summarizes the timeline of the experiment, including treatments and pay-
ment.
11Those who do not participate in part 2 still receive the bonus payment for part 1 after part 2.
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Figure 2.2.4: Timeline of Experiment
2.3 Results
We provide the results in this section, first providing background information on our
subjects, including their demographics and overall performance in the experiment. We
then look at the treatment effects on outcomes in part 1, followed by effects on part 2 and
the difference in outcomes between the two parts. We end this section with the heteroge-
neous treatment effects.
2.3.1 Overview of Subjects
We collected data from 2,003 subjects for part 1. They are distributed roughly evenly
across treatments at around 250 subjects per treatment. Subjects are younger andmore ed-
ucated than the U.S. population. 66% of subjects report having a college degree or more
(compared to the U.S. population at 31%) while there are relatively few subjects older
than 40 years old. The overwhelming majority of subjects, 86%, have some levels of em-
ployment.12
For part 2, 1,496 subjects completed the survey, a retention rate of 75%. Subjects who
do well in part 1 are more likely to come back: 1 more correct answer in part 1 savings
choice is associated with a 1% increase in the probability of completing part 2.13 However,
12Appendix B.1 contains summary statistics on subjects’ demographics.
13Appendix B.1 shows the number of subjects per treatment for part 1 and the number of thosewho return
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we do not find any attrition bias based on treatment assignment, which allows us to look
at the treatment effects on outcomes in part 2.
On average, subjects completed part 1 in 972 seconds (16.2 minutes), earning $1.08.
They completed part 2 in 956 seconds (16 minutes), earning $0.85. These earnings are on
top of the participation fees.
There are no apparent concerns about selection bias in our treatment assignment. First,
we randomly assign subjects into treatments as they arrive at our experiment. Second,
we check for demographic balance across the treatments by checking for the correlation
between the treatments and demographics as well as financial literacy score in part 1,
the result of which is in appendix B.1.14 The only significant difference is that subjects
randomized into high-incentive treatment aremore likely to have a college degree ormore.
This finding is consistent with a 5% random chance of a significant difference.
Figure 2.3.1 summarizes subjects’ financial literacy scores. On average, out of 5 ques-
tions, they answer 2.7 questions correctly, denoted by the red vertical line. Of the 4multiple-
choice questions, subjects answer 1.9 questions correctly, significantly better than random
choices.15 Besides, recall that the last two literacy questions are beyond what is measured
in literacy surveys. Hence, in figure 2.3.2, we focus on subjects’ performance in the ques-
tions from the OECD Survey and the National Capability Study. This shows that subjects
have relatively higher financial literacy than the general public, which is consistent with
their higher education levels compared to the U.S. population.
As a simple classification of subjects, we label thosewho answer 4-5 questions correctly
as the “high type”, θh, and those who have 2 or fewer correct answers as θl. At 4-5 correct
answers, θh must already have a good understanding of compound interest rates. At 2
or fewer correct answers, θl does not manage beyond the two straight-forward questions,
L1-2. Since it is not clear how to classify those who answer 3 questions correctly, we leave
for part 2.
14Appendix B.1 also shows that there is no attrition bias in part 1 based on the treatments.
15Given the number of options in each question, random choices yield an average of 1.04 correct answers.
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Figure 2.3.1: Financial Literacy - Part 1
Figure 2.3.2: Financial Literacy by Questions
Note: Data for L1 is from OECD (2017). The U.S. did not participate in this survey so we use data from the
U.K., France, Germany, and Canada, all of which have a score of 0.57-0.58. Other OECD countries in the
survey include Mexico (score: 0.12), Italy (0.47), Korea (0.52), Turkey (0.54), Japan (0.66), the
Netherlands (0.76), and Norway (0.80). Data for L2-3 is from Lin et al. (2019).
them (31% of subjects) as unclassified. 25% of subjects belong to θh, and 45% belong to θl.
We use this classification to understand the heterogeneous treatment effects.
Figure 2.3.3 shows the CDF of the logarithm of time θh and θl spend in different com-
ponents of the experiment to provide a better understanding of the types. All analysis on
time uses the logarithm of time, which is much closer to the normal distribution than the
level of time.16 On the one hand, figures 2.3.3a and 2.3.3b show that θh spendmore time to
answer the questions in both tasks, which may partially explain θh’s better performance.
16Appendix B.1 shows a sample comparison between the level and the logarithm of time using QQ-plots.
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On the other hand, to counter the worry that θl may be bots, figure 2.3.3c shows that θl
spend more time reading the instructions than θh. So θl spend time understanding the
requirement of the experiment but go through the questions quickly (and poorly).
Figure 2.3.3: Overall Time Spent in Components of the Experiment by Subjects’ Type
(a) CDF of lg(time) in Financial Literacy (b)CDFof lg(time) in SavingsAccount Task
(c) CDF of lg(time) in Instructions
2.3.2 Treatment Effects in Part 1
Before going to the treatment effects, we describe the subjects’ performance in the sav-
ings account task. On average, subjects spend 531 seconds (9minutes) in the task, answer-
ing 2.3 questions out of 6 questions correctly, significantly better than random choices.17
Only 18.4% of subjects (185 subjects) with available education access it. Of those who
access the materials, they spend 23.8 seconds on the materials.
Figure 2.3.4 shows subjects’ performance in the savings account task, broken down
17There are 6 questions, each of which has 4 options. So random choices yield 1.5 correct answers. If we
remove the question in which compound and simple interests give the same answer, subjects answer 1.52
questions correctly, significantly better than random choices at 1.25 correct answers.
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by questions to illustrate subjects’ tendency to underestimate compound interest rates.18
When compound and simple interest rates lead to different answers (questions 2 to 6),
subjects are significantly more likely to choose the simple-interest answers. Besides, the
probability of choosing the simple-interest answers is significantly more than random,
suggesting that this mistake is driven by more than random calculation errors and that
some subjects apply simple interest rates. 19
Figure 2.3.4: Savings Account Task - Part 1
In understanding the treatment effects, we use the baseline specification in equation
(2.1). On top of this specification, we add interaction terms where appropriate. To make
our exposition clearer, we sometimes split the same regression in multiple tables so that
we can focus on the relevant treatment. We will note when the tables come from the same
regression.
yi = β0 + β11{s = H}+ β21{e = E}+ β31{l = 1}+ εi (2.1)
18Questions are presented in random order. Figure 2.3.4 aggregate performance by the actual questions.
19The probability of choosing the simple-interest answers is higher than 0.25, which is the probability




1{s = H} = indicator for high incentives
1{e = E} = indicator for easiness
1{l = 1} = indicator for available education
We first look at the effect of easiness and incentives in table 2.3.1. First, the “easy” treat-
ment is indeed easier. When the variance of amounts of money is higher, i.e., choices are
further apart, subjects answer more questions correctly (first column) without spending
more time (third column). The improvement in choices is almost 30% from the baseline of
1.85 correct answers. Furthermore, the number of simple-interest answers decreases (sec-
ond column), suggesting that some of the simple-interest answers were due to random
errors. Nevertheless, this decrease is smaller than the increase in the number of correct
answers, indicating that easiness reduces other calculation errors as well.
Meanwhile, we recover the usual effects of incentives. A higher piece rate increases
both the time spent and the number of correct answers, which is in line with much of
the experimental evidence on incentives. But the effect size of incentives on the correct
answers, at 0.136, is significantly smaller than that of easiness, at 0.547.
Interestingly, unlike the effect of easiness, high incentives do not lead to a decrease
in simple-interest mistakes. Table 2.3.2, which focuses on the self-reported methods in
the savings accounts task, may explain why this is the case. Recall that in the debriefing
questions, we ask subjects to self-report how they choose the savings accounts. Table 2.3.2
shows the treatment effect on whether they report to have used “Estimation without ex-
plicit calculation”, “Calculation”, and “Use of the Rule of 72”.20 While easiness does not
change the self-reported methods, high incentives increase the probability subjects use
20Appendix B.1 shows the percentage of subjects who choose each method for both parts of the exper-
iment. There are very few subjects who choose the methods not in table 2.3.2. We also allow subjects to
choose more than one method because it is plausible to estimate for some accounts but calculate for the
others. However, few self-report more than one method (16% in part 1 and 10% in part 2).
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Table 2.3.1: Effect of Easiness and Incentives on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.547∗∗∗ -0.138∗ -0.0130
(0.0711) (0.0837) (0.0483)
High Incentives (P1) 0.136∗ -0.0996 0.194∗∗∗
(0.0711) (0.0837) (0.0483)
Constant 1.848∗∗∗ 2.725∗∗∗ 5.724∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0826) (0.0473)
Observations 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for education.
Note: Tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.4 are from the same regression.
explicit calculation at the expense of estimation. This suggests that the effect of high in-
centives may be more selective than that of easiness. High incentives may motivate only
a more savvy group to switch to a more precise method, and this group may already be
less prone to simple-interest mistakes. In contrast, easiness helps reducing errors for more
subjects. We explore this selection further in subsection 2.3.4 on heterogeneous effects.
Table 2.3.3 adds the interaction between incentives and easiness in the regressions in
table 2.3.1. The interaction does not have a significant effect on any outcome. We find this
to be the case for all of the analyses in part 2 as well. We take this as evidence that easiness
and incentives channels operate independently from each other.
We now turn to the education treatment by looking at the overall effect in table 2.3.4.
On the one hand, we find that making educational materials available improves choices
by both increasing the number of correct answers and decreasing the number of simple-
interest mistakes. Notably, the decrease in simple-interest mistakes is larger than the in-
crease in correct answers, indicating that subjects may have moved away from simple in-
terests but still made calculation mistakes to find the right answers.
On the other hand, making education available does not increase overall time spent,
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Table 2.3.2: Effect of Easiness and Incentives on Self-reported Methods
Self-reported Methods, Part 1
Estimation Calculation Rule of 72
Easy Questions (P1) 0.00829 0.0115 0.000192
(0.0214) (0.0203) (0.0145)
High Incentives (P1) -0.0411∗ 0.0467∗∗ 0.00295
(0.0214) (0.0202) (0.0145)
Constant 0.662∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.0713∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0131)
Observations 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for education.
Note: Tables 2.3.2 and 2.3.5 are from the same regression.
suggesting that reading and applying the Rule of 72 substitutes othermethods of choosing
the savings accounts. In otherwords, the educationalmaterials allow subjects to substitute
to a more effective way of answering the questions, and not encouraging them to spend
more time on the tasks.21 The effects on self-reported methods in table 2.3.5 confirm this
view: subjects are more likely to use the Rule at the expense of explicit calculation.
Tables 2.3.6 and 2.3.7 show the interaction between education and easiness and incen-
tives. We focus on easiness, then incentives. When questions are easy, there is no effect on
the probability that subjects access the educational materials (first column in table 2.3.6).
However, conditional on using the materials, they spend less time. Despite the lower ed-
ucational time, subjects in the easy treatment do as well as those in the difficult treatment
(the first two columns of table 2.3.7). So when questions are easy, subjects do not need to
spend as much time making use of the materials. This evidence suggests that return to
education is higher for easy problems, and that easiness complements education.
For the interaction between education and high incentives, from table 2.3.6, we find
21We recognize that substitution is more likely to be effective here because we design our questions for
a straight-forward application of the Rule of 72. Although this may be a specific feature of the task, for a
general situation, we can also think of designing materials that are most relevant to the problems at hand.
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Table 2.3.3: Interaction between Easiness and Incentives on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.531∗∗∗ -0.0574 0.0446
(0.0963) (0.116) (0.0683)
High Incentives (P1) 0.120 -0.0192 0.251∗∗∗
(0.0980) (0.119) (0.0686)
High x Easy (P1) 0.0322 -0.162 -0.115
(0.142) (0.167) (0.0966)
Constant 1.855∗∗∗ 2.686∗∗∗ 5.696∗∗∗
(0.0749) (0.0921) (0.0534)
Observations 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for education.
that incentives neither increase the probability that subjects access the materials nor affect
the time spent. However, table 2.3.7 shows that education is more effective with high
incentives. In fact, when incentives are low, education does not improve choices at all.
This suggests that although under high incentives, subjects may not have spent more time
on education, they either paymore attention to thematerials or apply the Rulemore often.
Incentives and education are, thus, also complementary in our data.
Appendix B.2 illustrates the treatment effects of easiness, incentives, and education on
the distributions of choices and time. They confirm the evidence on the average effects
presented here. Besides, we also show the effects on choices broken down by questions.
Themost noticeable pattern is that the effect of easiness survives in each question, empha-
sizing its strength over the effect of incentives and education.
To summarize, we show that by increasing the variance of the amounts in the accounts,
we simplify choices. Although subjects are not as motivated to study when choices are
easy, this does not compromise the effectiveness of education. At the same time, we re-
cover the usual effect of incentives: paying subjects more encourages them to spend more
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Table 2.3.4: Effect of Education on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
Education (P1) 0.160∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ 0.000646
(0.0711) (0.0837) (0.0483)
Constant 1.848∗∗∗ 2.725∗∗∗ 5.724∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0826) (0.0473)
Observations 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for incentives and easiness.
Note: Tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.4 are from the same regression.
Table 2.3.5: Effect of Education on Self-reported Methods
Self-reported Methods, Part 1
Estimation Calculation Rule of 72
Education (P1) -0.00272 -0.0380∗ 0.0978∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0202) (0.0145)
Constant 0.662∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.0713∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0131)
Observations 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for incentives and easiness.
Note: Tables 2.3.2 and 2.3.5 are from the same regression.
time and hence, do better. Even though they do not spend more time on educational ma-
terials, under high incentives, they seem to make use of education better to improve their
answers.
2.3.3 Treatment Effects in Part 2
This section presents the treatment effects on the outcomes of part 2 and how they
compared to outcomes in part 1. We add financial literacy scores to the list of outcomes
in part 2. Specifically, we look at the subjects’ performance in the last 3 questions, L3-
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Table 2.3.6: Effect of Easiness and Incentives on Educational Effort
Outcomes, Part 1
EduUse Lg(EduTime)
Easy Questions (P1) -0.00146 -0.331∗
(0.0129) (0.189)





Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 2.3.7: Effect of Education, Interacted with Easiness and High Incentives
Outcomes, Part 1
Education × Easiness Education × High Incentives
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time) Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.558∗∗∗ -0.186 0.0561 0.547∗∗∗ -0.139∗ -0.0129
(0.101) (0.119) (0.0666) (0.0711) (0.0837) (0.0483)
High Incentives (P1) 0.136∗ -0.0994 0.194∗∗∗ 0.00534 0.0116 0.173∗∗
(0.0712) (0.0837) (0.0483) (0.101) (0.118) (0.0665)
Education (P1) 0.171∗ -0.325∗∗ 0.0691 0.0293 -0.167 -0.0199
(0.0979) (0.119) (0.0686) (0.0962) (0.116) (0.0682)
Easy x Edu (P1) -0.0230 0.0952 -0.138
(0.142) (0.167) (0.0966)
High x Edu (P1) 0.262∗ -0.222 0.0412
(0.142) (0.167) (0.0966)
Constant 1.842∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗ 5.690∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗ 5.734∗∗∗
(0.0766) (0.0926) (0.0522) (0.0768) (0.0923) (0.0523)
Observations 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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5, because education was designed to tackle these questions. Moreover, as illustrated by
figure 2.3.2, the overwhelming majority of subjects could answer L1-2. Looking at the
score of all 5 questions does not change the results.
Table 2.3.8 shows that past incentives and easiness treatments do not affect perfor-
mance in part 2. Meanwhile, past education has an effect only on decreasing simple-
interest mistakes. We, again, look at the treatment effects on self-reported methods in
table 2.3.9 for more evidence on subjects’ decision-making processes. This indicates that
subjects assigned to the education treatment in part 1 remember the Rule of 72, which ex-
plains the decrease in simple-interest mistakes. Unfortunately, moving away from simple
interests is not sufficient to give the correct answers as there can be mistakes in applica-
tion.22
Table 2.3.8: Effect of Past Treatments on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 2
FinLit Savings Account
L3-5 Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
High Incentives -0.00540 0.0885 -0.0925 0.0817
(0.0517) (0.0865) (0.101) (0.0555)
Easy Questions -0.0134 0.00257 0.0309 -0.0168
(0.0517) (0.0865) (0.101) (0.0555)
Education -0.0448 0.109 -0.169∗ -0.0508
(0.0517) (0.0866) (0.101) (0.0555)
Constant 1.209∗∗∗ 2.111∗∗∗ 2.829∗∗∗ 5.563∗∗∗
(0.0517) (0.0831) (0.0996) (0.0547)
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for incentives and easiness.
For completeness, appendix B.3 shows the effects of the interaction between educa-
tion with easiness and incentives on outcomes in part 2. Similar to part 1, the interaction
22One subject emailed us after part 2, saying that she remembered there is the Rule of 72, but she did not
remember how to use it. She tried searching for the Rule on the internet, but she did not understand the
explanation she found.
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Table 2.3.9: Effect of Past Treatments on Methods
Self-reported Methods, Part 2
Estimation Calculation Rule of 72
Easy Questions 0.0172 -0.00519 -0.00131
(0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0151)
High Incentives -0.00503 0.0205 0.0199
(0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0151)
Education -0.0250 -0.0177 0.0498∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0151)
Constant 0.683∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0230) (0.0141)
Observations 1496 1496 1496
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for education.
between education and easiness has no significant effects on choices. However, the in-
teraction between high incentives and education has a significant effect on literacy scores
but not on the savings account answers. A potential explanation is that subjects apply the
Rule of 72 more in part 1 when incentives are high, which carry over to part 2. In literacy
questions, they need to apply the Rule only once, but in the savings accounts, they have
to apply the Rule four times, introducing more room for errors.
Finally, we look at the outcomes in part 2, relative to those in part 1. On average, the
change in the scores for L3-5 is 0.108, and that for the savings account task is -0.109. Both
are significantly different from 0, i.e., there is a time trend in which subjects score higher
financial literacy but lower in savings tasks. Table 2.3.10 looks at the treatment effects on
the change in outcomes. On the one hand, consistent with the evidence on easiness from
part 1, past easiness leads to worse performance in part 2 relative to part 1 because part 2
is now harder. This remarkably shows up in both the number of correct answers and the
number of simple-interest mistakes without a change in time.23 On the other hand, past
23The sums of the coefficient on “easy questions” and the constant are significantly different from 0 for
“∆ Correct Answer” and “∆ Simple I/R”.
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high incentives lead to a decrease in time spent without a decrease in the performance,
although the point estimates point in the correct direction.
Table 2.3.10: Effect of Treatments on Changes in Choices and Time
Change in Outcomes (P2-P1)
FinLit Savings Account
∆ L3-5 ∆ Correct Ans ∆ Simple I/R ∆ Lg(Time)
High Incentives -0.00571 -0.0518 0.0108 -0.115∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0788) (0.0929) (0.0425)
Easy Questions -0.0113 -0.523∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.0192
(0.0457) (0.0787) (0.0927) (0.0424)
Education -0.0199 -0.0121 0.138 -0.0195
(0.0457) (0.0788) (0.0929) (0.0424)
Constant 0.126∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.0313 -0.275∗∗∗
(0.0430) (0.0756) (0.0915) (0.0414)
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The results in part 2, thus, strengthen the easiness channel found in part 1. At the same
time, we also find that, over two weeks, subjects retain their knowledge of the Rule of 72,
but applying the Rule becomes more difficult. The diminished effect of education over
time is consistent with what has been documented in financial education, reinforcing the
idea that education should be provided as and when people make decisions.
2.3.4 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
This section looks at heterogeneous treatment effects between θh and θl. All results
presented are on outcomes in part 1 because we do not find any heterogeneous treatment
effects for part 2. Table 2.3.11 shows the baseline difference between θh and θl. Similar to
the financial literacy task, θh spend more time and do better in the savings account task.
They are also less likely to make simple-interest mistakes. Appendix B.4 explains this by
showing that θh is less likely to use estimation and more likely to use explicit calculation
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and the Rule of 72.
Tables 2.3.12 and 2.3.13 show the heterogeneous treatment effects. Given their higher
baseline performance, θh benefits less from easiness. Since θh already start with the pre-
cise calculation, variance in options matter much less. In fact, the sum of the coefficient
on “easy” and the interaction between “easy” and θh is not significantly different from 0.
Meanwhile, θh respond more to high incentives by spending more time, although the ex-
tra time does not lead to significantly better performance. Appendix B.4 shows that under
high incentives, θh switches evenmore to calculation at the expense of estimation, explain-
ing the greater time spent. The lack of improvement is likely due to a decreasing return
to calculation.
We do not find any difference in the effects of education for the types, as shown in table
2.3.13. Although θl may stand to benefitmore from the educational materials, they are less
likely to access such materials, which make education less useful to them.24
Table 2.3.11: Baseline Difference between θh and θl
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
θh 1.303∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.111) (0.0540)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.504∗∗∗ -0.103 0.0106
(0.0841) (0.101) (0.0547)
High Incentives (P1) 0.147∗ -0.105 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0844) (0.101) (0.0545)
Education (P1) 0.104 -0.188∗ -0.0117
(0.0843) (0.101) (0.0546)
Constant 1.516∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 5.336∗∗∗
(0.0759) (0.103) (0.0584)
Observations 1387 1387 1387
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
246.4% of θl and 11.8% of θh assigned to the education treatment access the materials.
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Table 2.3.12: Heterogeneous Effects of Easiness and Incentives
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time) Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
θh 1.522∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗ -0.292∗ 0.921∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.159) (0.0757) (0.140) (0.152) (0.0779)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.662∗∗∗ -0.133 0.0301 0.510∗∗∗ -0.104 0.0160
(0.0772) (0.118) (0.0726) (0.0840) (0.101) (0.0548)
High Incentives (P1) 0.135 -0.102 0.198∗∗∗ 0.0716 -0.102 0.130∗
(0.0842) (0.101) (0.0546) (0.0777) (0.118) (0.0724)
Education (P1) 0.0982 -0.187∗ -0.0125 0.101 -0.188∗ -0.0142
(0.0842) (0.101) (0.0547) (0.0843) (0.101) (0.0546)
θh × Easy (P1) -0.443∗∗ 0.0842 -0.0550
(0.206) (0.222) (0.108)
θh × High (P1) 0.214 -0.00665 0.197∗
(0.207) (0.223) (0.108)
Constant 1.447∗∗∗ 2.648∗∗∗ 5.327∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗∗ 2.634∗∗∗ 5.369∗∗∗
(0.0717) (0.107) (0.0621) (0.0741) (0.108) (0.0630)
Observations 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
2.4 Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, this paper and Huynh (2019), chapter 1 of this thesis,
are the first to show “easiness” in settings similar to common economic decisions. In per-
ceptual tasks, this “easiness” channel is a very robust finding. The economic literature
has started using this fact to study costs of attention. For example, Caplin et al. (2018)
uses a perceptual task of distinguishing polygons to recover attention costs. They vary
the difficulty of the tasks by changing the mixture of the shapes present and show that the
costs of attention shift with the difficulty levels. In this paper, we show the same result but
with a consumer finance task. The results survive even education intervention. Moreover,
Huynh (2019) shows that this channel may even dominate incentives.
Our design using compound interest rates relies on the existing literature on finan-
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Table 2.3.13: Heterogeneous Effects of Education
Outcomes, Part 1
Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
θh 1.318∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.157) (0.0728)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.504∗∗∗ -0.101 0.00999
(0.0843) (0.101) (0.0548)
High Incentives (P1) 0.148∗ -0.107 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0845) (0.101) (0.0546)
Education (P1) 0.115 -0.256∗∗ 0.00686
(0.0778) (0.118) (0.0725)
θh × Edu (P1) -0.0303 0.192 -0.0524
(0.206) (0.222) (0.108)
Constant 1.511∗∗∗ 2.669∗∗∗ 5.326∗∗∗
(0.0739) (0.107) (0.0625)
Observations 1387 1387 1387
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
cial choices and financial education. Ambuehl et al. (2014) uses a similar task to test for
the effect of teaching the Rule of 72 on the subjects’ valuation of savings accounts. Their
objective is to disentangle the “rhetoric” and the “substantial” components of education.
Besides, they use money paid out in the future, coupled with time preference measure-
ment, to understand the effects of education. In contrast, we look at other treatments,
primarily easiness and incentives, and how they interact with education. Time preference
measurement is also unnecessary in our experiment since we use back-dated accounts.
Other studies that look at education on interest rates, more broadly conceived, are Goda
et al. (2014) and Song (2020). Reviews of the general financial education literature can be
found in theseFernandes et al. (2014) and Kaiser and Menkhoff (2017).
On the broad literature on the effects of incentives, there have been many experiments
from the lab to the field on incentives (Camerer andHogarth (1999), Gneezy et al. (2011)).
The results are mixed and dependent on the types of tasks subjects complete. Our project
76
shows that incentives may have unexpected mechanisms such as simplifying choices.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper uses an experiment onMTurk to study the effects of payoff-irrelevant change
in variance of options, incentives, and education on behaviors. By using back-dated sav-
ings accounts, we can use a setting with realistic choices without being worried about
time preference. We also invite subjects back for a second experiment to understand the
within-subject effects of incentives and variance as well as long-term effects of education.
Wefind that increasingpayoff-irrelevant variancemakes a significant impact on choices,
in both the between-subject treatments in part 1 and the within-subject tasks in part 2.
When variance is higher, subjects make fewer mistakes and do better without spending
more time. We also find that easiness may complement education because subjects as-
signed to the easy treatment does not spend as much time studying and yet still benefit as
much from education.
Althoughwe find that education is effective in part 1, the effects are mostly short-lived.
While subjects remembered the core materials, mistakes in the application do not allow
them to sustain the benefits of education. This highlights the need for providingmaterials
as and when people need to make decisions.
This chapter provides more robust evidence of the easiness channel compared to chap-
ter 1. Applying this insight to real-world decisions may not be straightforward, but we
know that posted prices may not include all taxes and fees, thus, distorting the vari-
ance that can affect easiness. Besides, businesses sometimes use a point system instead
of the dollar system (grocery promotional points, credit card rewards, travel miles). Fu-
ture research can look at creative uses of these alternative denominations to aid decision-
making.
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Chapter 3: Identifying Preference for Flexibility
with Marina Agranov, Mark Dean, Evan Friedman, and Pietro Ortoleva
3.1 Introduction
The economic literature has long recognized that, in many instances, people do not be-
have according to standard models.1 One behavioral deviation which has received atten-
tion early is Preference for Flexibility (PFF), where uncertainty over future shocks induces
the desire to keep strictly more options in the choice set (Dekel et al. (2001)Kreps (1979)).
Although PFF is intuitive, experimental evidence for PFF needs to address two questions
from other violations of standardmodels. First, choices in experiments are often stochastic
(Hey and Carbone (1995)). Subjects may choose differently in repeated choices. Stochas-
tic choices may then cause people to choose the larger choice set randomly, which leads
to an over-estimation of PFF. Second, uncertainty over future shocks may, instead, cause
Preference for Commitment (PFC), where people want to restrict future choices to avoid
temptations (Amador et al. (2006),Dekel et al. (2001)). Thus, in measuring PFF, we need
to also allow for PFC as a benchmark of the effect of future uncertainty on behavior.
To address the above questions, we first derive theoretical upper bounds for PFF from
stochastic choices. We then test PFF against these upper bounds using an experiment with
menu choices that allow for both PFF and PFC. Our results show that subjects exhibit
PFF beyond the level that can be explained by stochasticity alone. In particular, there
is more PFF than PFC. As a follow-up, we present two alternative models for PFF and
a modification of our design, which can differentiate these models. We leave the data
1For a survey of the widespread violations of standard behaviors, please see Bernheim et al. (2019)
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collection and analysis of the follow-up experiment for future research.
For the upper bounds from stochastic choices, we observe that although noises may
give rise to PFF, because noises are symmetric, there should be as many instances of coun-
tervailing behaviors as instances of PFF. The countervailing behavior turns out to be either
indifference or PFC, depending on the types of noises considered. In other words, if all
PFF is from stochastic choices, we should also observe either thick indifference curves or
PFC.
Given these predictions on PFF, in our experiment, we use menu choices in which sub-
jects state their willingness to accept (WTA) to switch between two menus. One menu
contains two alternatives, and the other contains only one of those two alternatives. If
subjects choose the larger menu, they can choose later from the menu. As a result, if sub-
jects have strictly positive WTAs to switch from the larger menu to the subset regardless
of the subset, they have PFF. In contrast, if the WTAs are strictly negative for at least one
subset, they have PFC.
To vary the menus systematically, we use two lotteries, one fixed lottery and one vari-
able lottery. Both lotteries have two prizes and two associated probabilities. We change
the variable lottery by increasing one of the prizes, labeled as β, and keeping the other
prize fixed at $1. There are, in total, 15 menus of two lotteries, each associated with one β.
Each of these large menus is paired with two menus of one lottery, resulting in 30 menu
choices.
We find, on average, subjects exhibit PFF at 4.6 β’s. In contrast, they exhibit PFC only
at 1.1 β’s and indifference at 1 β’s. There are significantly more PFF than the theoretical
upper bounds from stochastic choices. Specifically, more than 60%of subjects exhibitmore
PFF than the level that can be explained by noises alone. This also means that the majority
of subjects have more PFF than PFC.
Our data on WTAs also allow us to measure how much subjects value Flexibility. On
average, subjects value the larger choice set at $0.59 more than the smaller choice set. If
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we restrict to instances where subjects exhibit PFF, subjects value the larger choice set at
$2.1 more than the smaller choice set. In other words, because the expected value of the
fixed lottery is $8, Flexibility, when present, is valued at 25% the expected value of one of
the options.
In the two alternative models, we present explanations for PFF. In the first model, we
apply the original explanation proposed by Kreps (1979), which involves uncertainty over
future shocks. In the second model, we suggest cost of attention as another reason. In the
experiment, since only one choice is selected for payment, subjectsmayprefer to delay pay-
ing the cost of learning her preference. Choosing the larger choice set allows her to do so.
These two models provide different predictions on the effect of changing the probability
of payment on PFF. We then show how the design can be modified to test the predictions.
For the remaining of this paper, we present the standard models, considering both
deterministic and stochastic choices, and the alternativemodels in section 3.2. We describe
our experimental design, discussing our choice of lotteries and how we elicit WTAs in
section 3.3. Results are in section 3.4. We end with a literature review in section 3.5 and
conclude in section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we derive the upper bounds for PFF under the standard models, un-
der deterministic and stochastic valuations. We then present two alternative models with
forward-looking decision-makers (DMs) and discuss their predictions for PFF, especially
the effect of an increase in payment probability.
Since our experiment uses menus of lotteries, we describe the models using lotteries
and expected utilities. We discuss the rationale behind using lotteries instead of other
objects in section 3.3.
80
3.2.1 Standard Models
3.2.1.1 Deterministic Valuation of Lotteries and Menus
First, consider a DMwho has to choose between lotteries p’s on a finite set of monetary
prizes Z = {z} ⊂ R+. We assume that this choice is governed by expected utilities. Let






where p denotes both the lottery and the probabilities it assigns to the prizes. If there
is a side payment s ∈ R, i.e., a payment the DM receives regardless of the outcome of the





Next, consider the DM’s choices between menus X’s of lotteries, plus side payments
s(X)’s. When a DM chooses a menu, she chooses a choice set from which she picks a
lottery later. In the standard model, the utility of a menu (X, s(X)) is the utility of the best
alternative in (X, s(X)).
U(X, s(X)) = max
p∈X
v(p, s(X))
Since u(·) is strictly increasing and continuous, U(X, s(X)) is strictly increasing and
continuous in s(X). Given a choice betweenmenus (X, s(X)) and (Y, s(Y )), theDMchooses
the menu with the best lottery in the grand set combining (X, s(X)) and (Y, s(Y )), , say
(X, s(X)). Later, she can choose the best lottery from (X, s(X)).
Consider special case where Y is a strict subset of X . Let s∗(Y ) be the side payment
such that the DM is indifferent between (X, 0) and (Y, s∗(Y )), i.e. U(X, 0) = U(Y, s∗(Y )).
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We can define different behaviors using s∗(Y ).
• The DM exhibits Preference for Flexibility if s∗(Y ) > 0, ∀Y ( X . In this case, the DM
shows a strict preference for the larger choice set regardless of the alternatives in the
smaller set.
• The DM exhibits Preference for Commitment if ∃Y ( X such that s∗(Y ) < 0. In this
case, the DM shows a strict preference for some smaller choice sets by paying to
reduce the number of alternatives.
• The DM exhibits Indifference if s∗(Y ) = 0,∀Y ( X .
The experiment uses this particular case to elicit PFF, PFC, and indifference. For easy
exposition for the rest of the section, we specify menus X and Y used in the experiment.
Menu X contains two lotteries, A and B(β) with β ∈ {1, 2, ..., 15} specified below, and
menu Y , contains exactly one of them.
A =

$1 with probability 50%
$15 with probability 50%
B(β) =

$1 with probability 25%
$β with probability 75%
Specifying s∗(Y ) for eachY , let s∗ (A, β) be such thatU ({A,B(β)}, 0) = U ({A}, s∗ (A, β))
and s∗ (B, β) be such that U ({A,B(β)}, 0) = U ({B(β)}, s∗ (B, β)).
There are a few straightforward predictions from the deterministic model. Because Y
is a strict subset of X , the DM always weakly prefers X to Y , or U(X, 0) ≥ U(Y, 0). Then,
by the strict monotonicity of U(Y, s) in s, s∗(Y ) ≥ 0 regardless of Y . In other words, the
DM does not have PFC. Besides, she does not have PFF either, as stated in the following
remark.
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Remark 1 (No PFF)
Consider the standard model with deterministic values of lotteries and menus.
If s∗(A, β) > 0 then s∗(B, β) = 0. If s∗(B, β) > 0 then s∗(A, β) = 0.
For the first statement in remark 1, if s∗(A, β) > 0, by the strict monotonicity of U(X, s)
in s, we have
U ({A,B(β)}, 0) = U ({A}, s∗(A, β)) > U ({A}, 0) = v(A, 0)
This implies that v(B(β), 0) > v(A, 0), meaning that
U ({A,B(β)}, 0) = v(B(β), 0) = U ({B(β)}, 0)
or s∗(B, β) = 0. The proof of the second statement is analogous.
Remark 1 states that the DM can strictly prefer {A,B(β)} to either menu {A}, or menu
{B(β)} but not both. She cannot always prefer the larger choice set and so does not have
PFF.
Besides PFF andPFC, thismodel also predicts that s∗(A, β) increaseswith β and s∗(B, β)
decreases with β. We will use this prediction to classify subjects and test the robustness
of our results. To see this, as β increases, B(β) becomes more valuable by the monotonic-
ity of u(·). As a result, U({A,B(β)}, 0) becomes more valuable. By the monotonicity of
U(X, s) in s, s∗(A, β), the side payment to {A}, increases to compensate for the loss of
B(β). Analogously, s∗(B, β) decreases with β.
Overall, figure 3.2.1 captures the predictions for s∗(A, β) and s∗(B, β) in the determin-
istic variation. β is plotted on the x-axis from 1 to 15 and s∗(Y )’s are plotted on the y-axis.
The pink dot indicates the β at which subjects are indifferent between A and B (β), i.e.
s∗(A, β) = s∗(B, β) = 0 .
While the deterministicmodel does not predict anyPFF, one natural question iswhether
that is still the case when there is stochasticity. Could randomness in choices lead to in-
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stances of PFF? To answer this, we consider two variations of stochasticity: stochastic val-
uation of lotteries and stochastic valuation of menus. Although these two extensions will
allow for PFF, they impose upper bounds, which we can test in our experiment.
3.2.1.2 Stochastic Valuation of Lotteries
Consider a model in which the values of lotteries A and B are not deterministic but
drawn from a random distribution with mean v(A) and v(B(β)) respectively. Every time
the DM compares A and B(β), she compares ṽ(A, ε) and ṽ(B, ε) drawn independently
across choices.2 The utility of lottery plus side payment and of menu follow analogously.
We assume here that there is no future stochasticity. All randomness is realized at the
time that subjects choose betweenmenus. We consider the alternative models where there
are additional noises when subjects choose frommenus, and subjects are forward-looking
in the next subsection.
We use ε to denote randomness in the values of lotteries without specifying its source.
For example, randomness could come from either classic additive error terms or changes
in risk aversion in a random parameter model (Apesteguia and Ballester (2018)). For our
predictions, these details do not matter.
Wherever the randomness comes from, there are three mutually exclusive and exhaus-
2In the experiment, for each β, the DM has two choices: {A,B(β)} versus {A}, and {A,B(β)} versus
{B(β)}. We assume that ṽ(·)’s are independent across these two choices. If the DM makes only one draw
of from the distributions for both choices, the predictions for PFF and PFC will be the same as those in the
deterministic case.
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tive events for s∗(Y )’s.
SA ṽ(A, ε) < ṽ(B(β), ε). Then s∗(A, β) > 0 and s∗(B, β) = 0.
SB ṽ(A, ε) > ṽ(B(β), ε). Then s∗(A, β) = 0 and s∗(B, β) > 0.
SC ṽ(A, ε) = ṽ(B(β), ε). Then s∗(A, β) = s∗(B, β) = 0.
Since different events may occur in different choices, it is possible that event SA oc-
curs in the choice between {A,B(β)} and {A} but event SB occurs in the choice between
{A,B(β)} and {B(β)}. This leads to both strictly positive s∗(A, β) and s∗(B, β) and the
DM exhibits PFF.
Although this model allows for PFF, it predicts that the DM should have at least as
many instances of indifference as those of PFF.
Remark 2 (As much Indifference as PFF)
Consider the standard model with stochastic values of lotteries.
P(s∗(A, β) > 0 and s∗(B, β) > 0) ≤ P(s∗(A, β) = s∗(B, β) = 0)
To see this, let Pk be the probability of event Sk listed above, k ∈ {A,B,C}. By the
reasoning above on PFF, we observe PFF with probability PAPB by independent draws of
ṽ(·)’s. On the flipped side, by an analogous reasoning, we observe s∗(A, β) = s∗(B, β) = 0
withprobability (1−PA)(1−PB). Because 1−PA = PB+PC ≥ PB and similarly, 1−PB ≥ PA,
we have remark 2.
The main insight here is that although randomness can give rise to PFF, the same ran-
domness also lead to a countervailing behavior that bounds PFF. In this case, the counter-
vailing behavior is indifference. As we shall see shortly, the countervailing behavior for
the other variation of stochasticity is PFC.
3.2.1.3 Stochastic Valuation of Menus
Consider now a different variation in which the values of menus X and Y are not
deterministic but are drawn from distributions with means U(X) and U(Y ) respectively.
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Every time the DM makes a choice, she decides based on Ũ(X, ε) and Ũ(Y, ε) indepen-
dently drawn from their distributions. Although we still have U(X) ≥ U(Y ), as in the
deterministic variation, it is now possible to have Ũ(X, ε) < Ũ(Y, ε), leading to s∗(Y ) < 0
and the DM exhibits PFC. Here, it is this PFC that imposes an upper bound on PFF.
Remark 3 (As much PFC as PFF)
Consider the standard model with stochastic values of menus.
P(s∗(A, β) > 0 and s∗(B, β) > 0) ≤ P(s∗(A, β) < 0 or s∗(B, β) < 0)
We prove remark 3 for a c ≥ 0. Consider the case when U({A,B(β)}, 0) = U({A}, 0) ≥
U({B(β)}, 0). By symmetric errors, this implies that
P (s∗(A, β) > c) = P (s∗(A, β) < −c) = PA(c)
and
P+B (c) = P (s
∗(B, β) > c) ≤ P (s∗(B, β) < −c) = P−B (c)
Note thatP(s∗(A, β) < −c or s∗(B, β) < −c) = PA(c)+(1−PA(c))P−B (c) andP(s∗(A, β) >
c and s∗(B, β) > c) = PA(c)P+B (c). Comparing the two probabilities show that remark 3 is
true when U({A,B(β)}, 0) = U({A}, 0) ≥ U({B(β)}, 0). An analogous proof works when
U({A,B(β)}, 0) = U({B(β)}, 0) ≥ U({A}, 0).
The above proof also shows that if there is stochasticity in both lotteries and menus,
the upper bound for PFF is still PFC. In this case, for each choice of menus, we have either
ṽ(A, ε) ≥ ṽ(B(β), ε) or ṽ(A, ε) ≤ ṽ(B(β), ε). This implies that either U({A,B(β)}, 0) =
U({A}, 0) or U({A,B(β)}, 0) = U({B(β)}, 0) where U(·) incorporates noises to lotteries.
Since in both cases there is as much PFC as PFF, the prediction is the same as that when
there are noises in only menus.
We summarize the predictions for PFF fromdifferent variations of the standardmodels
in table 3.2.1.
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Upper Bound for PFF 0 Indifference PFC
Note that the above predictions rely only on the assumptions of strictly increasing
U(X, s) in s and independent noises. So they apply to more general menus than those
of lotteries.
3.2.2 Models for Preference for Flexibility
We now consider twomodels for PFF, both of which rely on the idea that there is addi-
tional stochasticity when DMs choose from menus. To see why we consider such models,
note that to incentivize subjects, we pay them a randomly selected choice from the ex-
periment. For this randomly selected choice, if subjects choose a menu with two lotteries,
they can choose from themenuwhich lottery is paid. In contrast, if they choose the smaller
choice set, they are restricted to only one alternative. As a result, if there are noises be-
tween choices between menus and choices from menus, and subjects are forward-looking,
they may strictly prefer the larger choice set and exhibit PFF.
To put it in another way, note that the standardmodels above assume either that all un-
certainty is resolvedwhen subjects choose betweenmenus or that subjects are not forward-
looking. The models in this subsection assume the opposite. The two variations con-
sidered here differ in the types of uncertainty: exogenous subjective states versus costly
information. In exogenous subjective states, future noises are unavoidable. In costly in-
formation, the DM can avoid future uncertainty but choose to delay the resolution to save
on cost. Both variations consider only stochastic values of lotteries, not of menus, because
there is no “forward-looking” component for the stochastic values of menus.
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3.2.2.1 Exogenous Subjective States
Reconsider the model with stochastic values of lotteries, ṽ(·, ε), with two sets of noises
instead of one: ε1 in choices between menus, ε2 in choices frommenus. For our argument,
it is not essential how ε1 and ε2 may interact; we only need ε2 to be relevant to the final
utility.3
In this variation, we assume that ε2 is exogenous, which is the same as the formulation
with subjective states by Kreps (1979). ε2’s are exogenous in the sense that subjects cannot
fully predict ε2 when they choose between menus.
We redefine the utility of menus to account for the order in which ε’s are realized.
When the DM chooses from menus, the utility of menus is
U2(X, s(X)) = max
p∈X
ṽ(p, s(X), ε1, ε2)
Let π > 0 be the probability that a choice is randomly selected for payment. Then,
working backward, when the DM chooses between menus, the expected utility of menu,
aggregating over the distribution of ε2, is
U1(X, s(X)) = πEε2 (U2(X, s(X)))
U2(·) is qualitatively the same as U(·) in the model with stochastic lotteries. The dif-
ference lies in U1(·), which accounts for π and the expectation over ε2. In this variation, ε2
drives the prediction for PFF while π will not be important.4
Consider a DM who compares U1(·)’s for the menu choices in the experiment. Al-
though the final utilities of lotteries, ṽ(·, ε1, ε2)’s, are stochastic, her preference over menus
is deterministic as stated below.
3If ε2 does not affect the utility, we return to the standard model of stochastic values of lotteries.




Consider the model with exogenous subjective states.
U1({A,B(β)}, 0) ≥ U1({A}, 0), strict inequality if Pε2(ṽ(A, ε1, ε2) < ṽ(B(β), ε1, ε2))) > 0.
U1({A,B(β)}, 0) ≥ U1({B(β)}, 0), strict inequality if Pε2(ṽ(A, ε1, ε2) > ṽ(B(β), ε1, ε2))) > 0.
Note that in the model with one set of noises, we already know that the larger choice
set is weakly better than its strict subsets. What remark 4 adds is the condition for the strict
inequalities. Conditional on the realized ε1 and the distribution of ε2, if the DM cannot rule
out either choice as the better choice, she strictly prefers the larger choice set regardless of
the subsets. Uncertainty about the future leads to PFF.
There are two predictions for PFF generated with exogenous subjective states. First,
unlike the standard models, there is no necessary upper bound to PFF. For example, con-
sider the classical additive error model: ṽ(A, ε) = v(A) + ε. If ε has full support on R,
regardless of v(·)’s, there is no certainty over the relative order of ṽ(·, ε)’s. In other words,
the conditions for strict inequalities in both statements in remark 4 are satisfied. Therefore,
if some noises are not yet realized, the DMmay exhibit PFF for all pairs of A and B(β).
Second, changing π does not affect PFF. To make this point very stark, if PFF exists, it
does not change whether one random choice is paid or all choices are paid. To see this, fix
a value of π. By the definition of s∗(Y ) we have
U1(X, 0) = U1(Y, s
∗(Y ))
πEε2 (U2(X, 0)) = πEε2 (U2(Y, s
∗(Y )))
Because π cancels out on both sides of the equation, s∗(Y ), which measures PFF, does
not change with π. Intuitively, since PFF arises due to the uncertainty over ε2’s, s∗(Y )
compensates for this uncertainty by equating the expected values of future menus. Since
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this uncertainty is exogenous, π has no role in changing PFF as long as it is strictly positive.5
The next model makes the opposite prediction on the effect of π on PFF.
3.2.2.2 Costly Information
Consider a variation of noises in which the DM can resolve uncertainty at a cost, κ(·).
We can think of this variation of noises as private information about the lotteries, and κ(·)
as an introspection cost to learn the information.
We are agnostic about the form κ(·). The predictions do not change whether κ(·) is
a fixed cost or a continuous cost in the style of rational inattention (Matějka and McKay
(2015),Sims (1998)). However, when the cost is continuous, we need to formulate the
problem slightly differently. In this case, κ(·) depends on “how much” of the uncertainty
the DM has resolved.6 Then, it is more natural to have only one set of noise ε and find
“how much” is learned at different choices. We defer this formulation of continuous cost
to appendix C.1 and consider κ(·) as a fixed cost here for simplicity.
Let κ(·) be a fixed cost where paying κ(εt) perfectly reveals εt where t ∈ {1, 2}. To be
consistent with the model with exogenous subjective states, we assume that when the DM
chooses between menus, she has incurred κ(epsilon1), and hence, know ε1.7 The DM now
has to decide whether to incur κ(ε2) and resolve all noises. She has three exclusive choices
listed below, together with the associated utilities U1(·)’s and U2(·)’s.
K1 Not pay κ(·)
U2(X, s(X)) = maxp∈X ṽ(p, s(X), ε1)
U1(X, s(X)) = πU2(X, s(X))
K2 Pay κ(·) when she chooses between menus
5If π = 0, this subsection on future stochasticity is unnecessary.
6Tomap thismore closelywith rational inattention literature, we can think of noises as states of theworld.
The DM decides how much information about the realized state of the world she wants to know.
7Working backward from the decision to pay κ(ε2) in remark 5, the DM may delay κ(ε1) too. This case
strengthens the prediction for PFF for costly information.
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U2(X, s(X)) = maxp∈X ṽ(p, s(X), ε1, ε2)
U1(X, s(X)) = πU2(X, s(X))− κ(ε2)
K3 Pay κ(·) later when she chooses from menus
U2(X, s(X)) = maxp∈X ṽ(p, s(X), ε1, ε2)− κ(ε2)
U1(X, s(X)) = πEε2 (U2(X, s(X)))
In K1, the DM decides not to incorporate ε2 in her decision. In K2, she pays κ(ε2) at the
same time as κ(ε1). In both cases, there is no future stochasticity. As such, for K1 and K2,
the DM’s choices are the same as those in the standard model with stochastic values of
lotteries: she may exhibit PFF, but PFF is bounded above by indifference.
In contrast, in K3, the DM delays incurring κ(ε2) until she has to choose from menus.
As a result, her choices betweenmenus are the same as those in themodel with exogenous
subjective states: she does not know ε2 now, but she will know it later. The uncertainty
over ε2 may then induce her to prefer the larger choice set strictly.
Whether the DM chooses to delay κ(ε2) depends on the magnitude of κ(ε2) and π.
Remark 5
Consider the model with a fixed cost of information.
Let k = Eε2 (maxp∈X ṽ(p, s(X), ε1, ε2))−maxp∈X ṽ(p, s(X), ε1).
If κ(ε2) < k and π < 1, the DM strictly prefers delaying κ(ε2). Otherwise, she may never pay or
is indifferent over when to pay κ(ε2).
When the DM delays paying κ(ε2), the prediction for PFF is the same as that using
exogenous subjective states: there is no upper bound for PFF. However, the condition for
delaying κ(ε2) depends on π, in contrast to exogenous subjective states. In this formulation
of fixed cost, PFF decreases at π = 1 compared to when π < 1. When π = 1, the DM is
indifferent betweenK2 andK3, and recall that inK2, PFF is bounded above by indifference.
Note that in this formulation, when π < 1, increasing π does not affect PFF because
the cost is fixed. As long as π < 1, regardless of the size of π, κ(ε2) is delayed, and PFF
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is the same. In appendix C.1 with continuous cost, we show that π has a more gradual
effect on PFF. Intuitively, PFF arises here because the DM wants to save on costs: since
not all choices are paid, spending effort thinking about them may not be useful. When π
increases, the benefit of spending effort increases, which in turn, reduces PFF.
We summarize the predictions for PFF from the alternativemodels in table 3.2.2, which
can be tested in a follow-up experiment.




Upper Bound for PFF N/A N/A
Increasing π on PFF No Effect Decreasing
3.3 Experimental Design
This section details our experimental design to test for PFF. We first describe how we
use the Multiple Price Lists (MPLs) to elicit preferences. We then outline the tasks in the
experiment, explaining how the MPLs allow for different types of behaviors such as PFF
and PFC. We also discuss why we use lotteries and why we include other tasks besides
menu choices.
Next, we suggest a modification to the design which can disentangle the alternative
models for PFF butwe relegate this experiment to future research. Wewrap up this section
with the implementation details of the experiment.
3.3.1 Elicitation Mechanism: Multiple Price Lists (MPLs)
The MPLs, an example of which is in figure 3.3.1, are used throughout the experiment
to elicit preferences. A typical MPL consists of a series of rows with two alternatives. In
each row, subjects have to indicate which alternative they prefer. Coupled with a compen-
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sation scheme that randomly pays one row, the MPLs incentivize subjects to be truthful
about their preferences.8 To make the MPLs easier to use, they typically are varied mono-
tonically: the alternatives on the right column become increasingly more attractive. For
example, in figure 3.3.1, the left column always consists of the fixed lottery, and the right
column consists of increasing amounts of money.
Figure 3.3.1: Risk Attitude
To reduce the burden of answering the MPLs, we leverage the monotone feature to
implement “automatic-filling”. Instead of choosing the preferred alternative in every row,
subjects need only pick the “switch row”, at which they “first” prefer the option on the
right.9 In figure 3.3.1, the “switch row” is the rowwith $2.25 on the right. A program then
automatically fills the answers such that the right column is chosen for all rows below
the “switch row” and the left column is chosen for all rows above the “switch row”. This
8If a subject lies about her preference in a particular row and that row is randomly chosen for payment,
she receives a lower utility than what she could have received from truth-telling.
9Alternatively, they can also pick the row at which they “last” prefer the left option. We inform subjects
of both methods to record their answers in the instruction.
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“automatic-filling” feature reduces measurement errors particularly when the MPLs are
long, as is the case for some of our questions.10
To ensure a minimum level of attention and hence minimize noises in the data, we
implement a minimum 15-second stay in each question. Subjects cannot proceed to the
next question before the 15-second lapse. We maintain this minimum lapse throughout
the experiment.
3.3.2 Main Experiment
Our main objective is to measure the WTAs to switch between menus of lotteries. This
task, however, requires familiarity with both lotteries and menus. As a result, we add a
risk-attitude and a menu-of -money task to introduce subjects to these objects. Besides,
we want to provide possible empirical links between PFF and other “non-standard” be-
haviors. For instance, subjects who violate the Independence Axiom may have more PFF
for menus of lotteries. So, we add a task on sophistication and Allais-type questions. We
elaborate on each task below. The timeline of our experimental session is as follows:
1. Risk Attitude
2. Menus of Money
3. Menus of Lotteries (Main Task)
4. Sophistication and Allais-type Questions
3.3.2.1 Risk Attitude
We familiarize subjects with lotteries by using standard risk-attitude questions. We
ask subjects two questions eliciting their certainty equivalence of two lotteries. The first
lottery is in figure 3.3.1: 50% chance of $6 and 50% of $0. The second lottery is 50% of $8
10In the choices between menus of lotteries, each MPL has 20 rows.
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and 50% of $2. In each MPL, the left column is always the lottery, and the right column is
a series of increasing amounts of money.
3.3.2.2 Menus of Money
This task introduces subjects to choices over menus by using the simplest possible
menus: menus of amounts of money. Figure 3.3.2 shows a sample question. The structure
is the same as that in the main task: there are two menusX and Y , where Y is a strict sub-
set of X . X is always on the left column, and Y is always on the right column. In figure
3.3.2, X = {$5, $2} and Y = {$5}.
Following the framework in section 3.2, we measure PFF and PFC through side pay-
ments to the menus: strictly negative s(Y )’s for PFC and strictly positive s(Y )’s for PFF,
ordered in increasing s(Y )’s following the monotone feature of the MPLs. However, to
avoid asking subjects to pay us for their choices, we implement the strictly negative s(Y )’s
by setting s(X) > 0 and s(Y ) = 0 instead.
A subtle feature of the MPL design is the measurement of strict preference, and hence,
indifference in a grid. Consider a subject who strictly prefers Y toX , but the strict prefer-
ence is “small”, i.e., s∗(Y ) is strictly negative but small. If the spacing of the grid is greater
than s∗(Y ), we will observe that the “switch row” is at s(X) = s(Y ) = 0. We may then
attribute this to indifference, which is incorrect. To address this concern andmeasure both
indifference and strict preference accurately, we implement a $0.01 grid right before and
after the row with s(X) = s(Y ) = 0.
As illustrated in figure 3.3.2, our finalMPL formenus consists of positive side payments
forX in the first few rowswhich decrease to 0. After that, there are positive side payments
for Y which increase from 0. The grid are generally spaced $0.5 apart except for the $0.01
grid around s(X) = s(Y ) = 0.
There are 6 questions in this task. The questions are constructed from 3 versions of
menu X : {$5, $2}, {$5, $3}, and {$5, $4}. Each X is paired with two Y ’s, which are the
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Figure 3.3.2: Menus of Money
two subsets of one alternative. Before the task, we also provide extensive training with
practice questions and detailed feedback.11
Under the standard assumption that subjects prefer more money to less, the utilities
in this task are observable. For each choice, we can, thus, evaluate whether the choice is
objectively correct and control for possible misunderstandings for choices over menus in
the main task.
3.3.2.3 Menus of Lotteries
Most of our analysis is on this task. Figure 3.3.3 shows a sample question. Menu X
with two lotteries is always on the left, menu Y with one lottery is always on the right.
Initially, a positive side payment is applied toX , which decreases as one moves down the
rows. After this reaches 0, an increasing positive side payment is applied to Y . Most side
11In our first session, which we removed from our analysis, we had an error in the feedback message for
one practice question.
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payments jump by $0.5 while those right before and after the direct comparison between
X and Y jump by $0.01.
Figure 3.3.3: Menus of Lotteries
We explain our use of lotteries instead of other objects for the experiment. There are
two main challenges with an experiment on PFF. First, we expect that subjects exhibit
“non-standard” behaviors only for “hard” choices. For instance, we do not expect PFF
for the “menu-of-money” task described above. This leads to the other challenge: which
choices are “hard”may be individual-specific. Since peoplemay perceive different choices
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as hard, which choices should be included is not apparent.
Using lotteries address the above challenges. We reproduce our lotteries, A and B(β),
where β ∈ {1, 2, ..., 15}, below for ease of explanation. Both A and B(β) are simple two-
prize lotteries. At one extreme of β’s, β = 1, A first-order stochastically dominates B(β)
while at the other extreme, β = 15, B(β) first-order stochastically dominates A. We, thus,
expect that choices are easier at either extreme but harder for intermediate values. Besides,
different intermediate β’s can be hard for different subjects without compromising our
ability to detect “non-standard” behaviors.
A =

$1 with probability 50%
$15 with probability 50%
B(β) =

$1 with probability 25%
$β with probability 75%
With 15 values of β, we have 30 questions, 2 questions per β ({A,B(β)} versus {A},
and {A,B(β)} versus {B(β)}). Tominimize noises, and hence, the chance of finding “non-
standard” behaviors, we present the questions in order of increasing β. For each β, we first
elicit s∗(B, β) and then s∗(A, β).
3.3.2.4 Sophistication and Allais-type Questions
The last taskmeasures other types of behaviors thatmay have an empirical relationship
with PFF. We do not attempt to test our findings against anymodels and treat this exercise
in the spirit of Chapman et al. (2018). The behaviorswe are interested in are sophistication
and violations of the Independence Axiom in the style of the Allais paradox. There are 5
questions in this section.
Sophistication is a natural question for choices between menus. We want to check if
subjects’ menu choices are consistent with their choices of lotteries. To be more concrete,
98
let β∗ be the β at which subjects are indifferent between A and B(β). If subjects are so-
phisticated, for β < β∗, subjects strictly prefers A to B(β), so, s∗(B, β) > 0. Similarly, or
β > β∗, subjects strictly prefers B(β) to A, so, s∗(A, β) > 0. To test sophistication, we add
the question in figure 3.3.4a to elicit β∗.
We check for violations of the IndependenceAxiom (figure 3.3.4b) because of our focus
on lotteries. There are 4 questions with two paired choices, as follows:
Pair I: for z ∈ {4, 4.25, 4.5, ..., 7, 7.5, 8, 9, 10}12
I.C1. (a) 100% of $4 OR (b) (20% of $0, 80% of $z)
I.C2. (a) (25% of $4, 75% of $0) OR (b) (20% of $z, 80% of $0)
Pair II: for z ∈ {8, 8.25, 8.5, ..., 12, 12.50, 13, 14, 15}
II.C1. (a) 100% of $8 OR (b) (20% of $0, 80% of $z)
II.C2. (a) (25% of $8, 75% of $0) OR (b) (20% of $z, 80% of $0)
To summarize, with this experiment, we can test the predictions for PFF from the stan-
dard models summarized in table 3.2.1 using answers from menus of lotteries. In doing
so, we can control for mistakes from menus of money. At the same, we provide empirical
links between PFF and other behaviors with the sophistication and Allais questions.
3.3.3 Follow-up Experiment
As we will show in section 3.4 that there is substantial PFF among our subjects, a nat-
ural question is why subjects exhibit PFF. We propose two models, subjective states and
costly information, in section 3.2, which differ in their predictions of the effect of payment
probability on PFF. The follow-up experiment can, thus, change the payment probability
as the treatment to tell the two models apart.





To do that, we can pick two β’s, β1 and β2, among {1, 2, ..., 15} to form two treatments
Tβ1 and Tβ2. In the main experiment, all β’s are equally likely to be selected for payment.
In contrast, in Tβ1, β1 has a higher chance of being selected. Specifically, we choose the
choices associated with β1 80% of the times (i.e., 40% for each choice) and choose the
remaining choices 20% of the times. We do analogously for Tβ2.
We can then compare PFF at β1 and β2 across the two treatments. β1 has a higher chance
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of being paid in Tβ1 but a lower chance of being paid in Tβ2. If the model of subjective
state is correct, this should not have any effect on PFF at β1. However, if themodel of costly
information is correct, PFF should be lower at β1 in Tβ1 compared to Tβ2. We should also
observe a similar effect for β2.
To ensure that subjects are aware that the “treated” β has a higher payment probability,
we remind them in a screen before the MPLs and ask them to choose the correct proba-
bility. To minimize the effect of having a screen before the MPLs, we add similar screens
to other MPLs, stating that they are “normal” questions without the high probability of
payment.
Among the 15 values, we choose β1 and β2 with the highest amount of PFF in the main
experiment. This allows us to maximize power in the follow-up experiment. They turn
out to be {6, 7}, as illustrated in the results.
3.3.4 Experiment Implementation
To incentivize subjects to truthfully reveal their preferences, at the end of the experi-
ment, we randomly select one MPL, then randomly select one row of that MPL for pay-
ment. If, in the randomly selected row, subjects choose menu X with two alternatives,
we ask them to pick which lottery is paid. Otherwise, subjects are paid the only available
alternative. If the alternative is a lottery, the payment is the outcome of the lottery.
All data were collected at the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sci-
ences. We conducted 5 sessions and collected responses from 66 subjects. Subjects receive
a participation fee of $10 on top of the payment from the randomized MPL.
3.4 Results
We first provide an overview of subjects, especially their misunderstanding of choices
between menus. We then move on to testing the predictions of the standard models in
section 3.2 and showing the extent of PFF.
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In analyzing choices over menus, we are mindful of the limitation in our data. Because
theMPLoffers choices in a discrete grid, we do not directly observe s∗ (A, β) or s∗ (A, β) (or
the equivalent s∗(Y )’s in menus of money). Instead, our grid allows us to bound s∗(·)’s
between the “switch row” and the immediately preceding row. In other words, we can
bound s∗(·)’s between the lowest side payment at which Y is chosen and the highest side
payment at whichX is chosen. Before testing the model predictions, we define the empir-
ical conditions accounting using these bounds.
3.4.1 Overview of Subjects
We show evidence of subjects’ understanding of the experiment as well as provide a
summary of subjects’ risk aversion and violations of the independence axioms.
Table 3.4.1 presents the number of subjects by the number of mistakes in the menu-of-
money task, broken down by session.13 In total, 55 of 66 subjects (83%) make no mistakes
(out of a possible 6). There is also no apparent difference across sessions. We take this as
confirming that the bulk of the subjects understood what was going on in the experiment.




1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 10 8 5 14 18 55
1 0 2 0 0 1 3
2 1 0 0 0 0 1
3 1 1 1 0 0 3
5 0 1 0 1 1 3
6 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 12 12 6 16 20 66
Of themistakesmade, the switch rows tend to be smaller than the “correct” row, which
provides useful context for our analysis on PFF and PFC. For example, when Y is as good
13Themeasurement of “mistakes” accounts for the limitation of the grid. For example, in figure 3.3.2, both
switching at s(X) = s(Y ) = 0 and s(X) = 0, s(Y ) = 0.01 are “correct”.
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asX , and subjects make amistake, they tend to choose a strictly negative switch row. Only
4 out of 11 subjects whomakemistakes ever choose switch rows greater than the “correct”
row. For those making mistakes, the mistakes may be explained by confusion (instead of
lack of attention) because the number of mistakes is positively correlated with the time
taken to answer the questions. The correlation between the number of mistakes and the
logarithm of time spent is 0.4, significant at 1% level. In other words, despite spending
more time, some subjects still make more mistakes.
Tables 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 summarize subjects’ risk attitude and violations of the indepen-
dence axioms for each of the risk-attitude and Allais-type questions. For risk attitude,
subjects on the “diagonal line” display consistent behavior, and we can classify them (51
out of 66 subjects). For Allais-type questions, if subjects exhibit opposite violations, we
leave themunclassified and classify the rest (58 out of 66 subjects) according to their single
violations or two consistent violations.
Table 3.4.2: Risk Attitudes
Lottery 1 Lottery 2
Risk Averse Risk Loving Risk Neutral
Risk Averse 24 1 4
Risk Loving 4 9 1
Risk Neutral 4 1 18
Table 3.4.3: Allais-type Violation
Pair I Pair II
Allais Anti-Allais No Violation
Allais 19 1 5
Anti-Allais 7 7 4
No Violation 7 1 15
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3.4.2 Choices between Menus of Lotteries
Before analyzing choices betweenmenus of lotteries, we define the empirical analogues
of s∗(A, β) and s∗(B, β) as s̄(A, β) and s̄(B, β), the “switch rows” recorded in the MPL. For
example, in figure 3.3.3, s̄(B, β) = 2. If we denote s̄(·, β)− as the immediately preceding
row of s̄(·, β), then we can bound s∗(·) as s̄(·, β)− ≤ s∗(·, β) ≤ s̄(·, β).
We redefine PFF, PFC, and indifference using s̄(·)’s as follows:
• At a fixed β, a subject exhibits Preference for Flexibility if s̄(A, β) ≥ 0.5 and s̄(B, β) ≥
0.5. In this case, s∗(·, β) ≥ s̄(·, β)− ≥ 0.01 for both A and B. The subject shows strict
preference for the larger choice set.
• At a fixed β, a subject exhibits Preference for Commitment if either s̄(A, β) ≤ −0.01 or
s̄(B, β) ≤ −0.01. In this case, s∗(A, β) ≤ −0.01 or s∗(B, β) ≤ −0.01. The subject
shows strict preference for the smaller choice set.
• At a fixed β, a subject exhibits Indifference if s̄(A, β) ∈ {0, 0.01} and s̄(B, β) ∈ {0, 0.01}.
Using the above definitions, figure 3.4.1 shows sample plots of s̄(·)’swhich demonstrate
all the listed behaviors: PFF (for β ≤ 13 in figure 3.4.1b), PFC (for β ∈ {11, 12} in figure
3.4.1c), and indifference (for β ∈ {4, 5, 6, 10, 11} in figure 3.4.1d). We also provide figure
3.4.1a of a completely “standard” subject as a reference.
3.4.3 Existence of PFF
To show that there is a significant level of PFF that cannot be explained by the standard
models, figure 3.4.2 provides the aggregate levels of PFF compared to PFC and indiffer-
ence. For each subject, we count the number of β’s at which subjects exhibit PFF, PFC, and
indifference. For example, the subject in figure 3.4.1b exhibits PFF at 13 β’s, PFC and indif-
ference at 0 β. Figure 3.4.2a then provides the number of subjects with the corresponding
number of β’s with PFF (ranging from 0 to 15); the red vertical line shows the average
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Figure 3.4.1: Sample Individual Plots of s̄(·)’s
(a) A “Standard” Subject (b) A Subject with PFF
(c) A Subject with PFC (d) A Subject with Indifference
Note: To visually distinguish ±$0.01 from $0, we use “p” for $0.01 and “m” for -$0.01.
number of β’s for PFF (at 4.6 β’s). We do the same for PFC and indifference in figures
3.4.2c and 3.4.2b.
Recall that the standard models predict that PFF is bounded above by 0, indifference,
or PFC. Figure 3.4.3 shows the number of subjects by the difference between PFF and in-
difference (figure 3.4.3a) and by the difference between PFF and PFC (figure 3.4.3b). In
both cases, more than 60% of subjects have strictly more PFF than that predicted by the
stochastic choices. Table 3.4.4 confirms the evidence further by testing the difference be-
tween PFF and the theoretical upper bounds. In the first row, the number of PFF instances
is significantly greater than the theoretical upper bounds for all subjects. In the second
row, we restrict the tests to subjects who have at least one instance of PFF to emphasize
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Figure 3.4.2: Histograms of Different Behaviors
(a) Frequencies of PFF
(b) Frequencies of Indifference (c) Frequencies of PFC
that PFF, when exists, cannot be explained by noises.
3.4.3.1 Extent of PFF
Here we give more details on the PFF the subjects exhibit. Figure 3.4.4a shows the
number of subjects with PFF at each β from 1 to 15. Recall at β = 1, A first-order stochasti-
cally dominates B(β) and the opposite is true for β = 15. In other words, at the two ends
of β, in all models, subjects need a larger error or greater uncertainty over future shocks to
have PFF compared to the intermediate values. We, thus, expect less PFF at the two ends,
which appears to be the case in figure 3.4.4a. While this data provides evidence that sub-
jects understand their choices, it also suggests that in the follow-up experiment, we can
randomize between β = 6 and β = 7, both of which have the most PFF, to have a higher
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Figure 3.4.3: Histograms of PFF - Theoretical Upper Bounds
(a) PFF - Indifference (b) PFF - PFC







PFF - Upper Bound 4.61∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.74) (0.76)




Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values are from one-sided tests.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
probability of payment. Targeting these β’s gives us more power to detect the difference
between the alternative models.
Figure 3.4.4b shows subjects’ valuation of flexibility. The red line plots the average of
min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} for all subjects at each β together with the 95% confidence interval.
Note that because some subjects display PFC, it is theoretically possible for the average
of min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} to be negative. But the red line always stays strictly positive. The
orange line plots the analogous values but only for subjects who display PFF at each β.
For instance, for subjects who have PFF at β = 1, the larger choice set is valued at $2 more
than the smaller choice set. Given that the expected value of the fixed lottery is $8, the
orange line shows that subjects value the flexibility at 25% of the expected value of one
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Figure 3.4.4: Extent of PFF
(a) PFF by β’s (b) Average min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} by β
alternative.
While the min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} for subjects with PFF seems to stay relatively constant
at around $2, there is a jump at β = 15. We believe this is because of fatigue for the last
question (recall that questions are presented in the order of increasing β’s and subjects
know how many questions there are in each task). Figure 3.4.5 provide evidence of this
last-question fatigue: both subjects are mostly standard until the last question.
Figure 3.4.5: More Empirical Plots of s̄(·)’s
3.4.3.2 PFF and other Behaviors
We finally turn to the empirical relations between PFF and other behaviors, including
sophistication violation, risk aversion, and violation of the independence axiom.
108
Recall that in the sophistication question, subjects indicate β∗ at which they are indif-
ferent betweenA andB(β∗). Subjects violate sophistication if either s̄(B, β) ≤ 0 for β < β∗
or s̄(A, β) ≤ 0 for β > β∗. In either case, they are not willing to pay to keep the preferred
alternative in the choice set. Figure 3.4.6 shows the number of subjects with the associated
number of sophistication violation. The majority of subjects (41 out of 66) do not violate
sophistication.
Figure 3.4.6: Violation of Sophistication
Note that sophistication violation, intuitively, runs in contrast with PFF. In sophistica-
tion violation, subjects are unwilling to keep the preferred alternative. In otherwords, they
“undervalue” the larger choice set conditional on their β∗’s. This intuition is borne out in
the negative correlation between sophistication violation and PFF, at -0.24, significant at
5% level.
Tables 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 show the relation between PFF and risk attitude and violation
of independence axiom. There is no significant relation between PFF and risk attitude.14
However, subjects who do not violate the independence axiom have significantly less PFF.
This seems natural because those who do not violate the independence axiom may be
better at valuing lotteries, and consequently, menus of lotteries.
14Table 3.4.5 shows that there is no significant difference in PFF between risk neutrality and non-neutrality.
There is also no significant difference between risk-averse and risk-loving subjects.
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No. of PFF β 5.06 3.11 1.95
(0.84) (1.10)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3.4.6: PFF and Allais
Violation No Violation Difference
No. of PFF β 5.14 2.00 3.14∗∗
(0.74) (0.96)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
3.5 Literature
This project builds on the emerging literature on menu choices to understand PFF and
PFC. On flexibility, Danan et al. (2006) asks subjects to choose between menus of lottery
and money and their strict subsets. However, all choices in this paper use only one pos-
itive side payment to the smaller choice sets instead of MPLs. As a result, although they
document PFF, they cannot rule out that stochastic choices could drive their observations.
In contrast, by using MPLs and thus allowing for both PFC and indifference, our paper
documents PFF beyond what could be explained by stochasticity.
The paper which is closest to ours in methodology is Dean and McNeill (2015), which
uses MPLs to measure preferences over menus of work contracts. They then link menu
preferences to stochastic choices from menus afterward. Our paper use menus of lotter-
ies, which allow us to vary choices more continuously, thus allowing varying degrees of
PFF on different choices. This design, in turn, gives us the modification in the follow-up
experiment where we can vary the probability of payment to pin down the reasons for
PFF.
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Besides menu choices, alternative methods to document PFF are deferral costs and
valuation of the size of choice sets. For example, Costa-Gomes et al. (2019) asks sub-
jects to choose alternatives from a set but with the option of paying to defer the choice to
later. Meanwhile, Sonsino and Mandelbaum (2001) looks at subjects’ valuation of choice
sets with different sizes. In either of these alternatives, subjects are not choosing between
menus: their decisions are restricted to one menu.
On commitment, there have been many experiments, both in the lab and in the field,
which focus on real-effort tasks (Kaur et al. (2015),Toussaert (2018)), financial choices
(Ashraf et al. (2006),Afzal et al. (2018)), andhealth-related behaviors (Toussaert (2019),Schilbach
(2019)). The common thread across these behaviors, which leads to demand for commit-
ment, is self-control. Our use of lotteries has a weaker link to the temptation problem but
shows that by measuring both PFF and PFC, we can use PFC as a benchmark for PFF.
We are also motivated by the consideration for stochastic choices and preference un-
certainty from other literature. Experiments that elicit the same choices repeatedly often
observe that subjects change their answers. This has led to work that looks at stochastic
choices as a subject of study (Hey and Carbone (1995),Agranov and Ortoleva (2017)).
Meanwhile, there is only a small set of work documenting preference uncertainty directly.
Cubitt et al. (2015) allows subjects to state they are “not sure” in their choices while Agra-
nov andOrtoleva (2020) gives subjects the option to randomize between alternatives. This
project does not directly elicit preference uncertainty but looks at its implication for PFF.
3.6 Conclusion
This project uses menu choices to measure Preference for Flexibility. We do so by using
theMPLs, which can also measure Preference for Commitment as a benchmark and subjects’
valuation of flexibility. Moreover, we derive theoretical upper bounds for flexibility to
account for stochastic choices, often a concern in experimental data. The theoretical upper
bounds consider both stochasticities in choices between menus and choices from menus.
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Our experiment shows that there aremore instances of PFF thanwhat can be explained
by stochastic choices. In particular, there is more PFF than PFC. We also find that subjects
value the flexibility at 25% the expected value of one option in the menus. For future
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 More on Subject Overview
A.1.1 Demographics and Randomization
Table A.1.1: Demographics: Subjects versus US population
Subjects US Census
Male 55% 49%










No Insurance 18% 9%
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Table A.1.2: Number of Subjects by Treatment Arms










Table A.1.3: Demographics Balance across Treatments
Male College White Age No Insurance
High Incentive -0.0124 0.00248 -0.0133 -0.0189 -0.0466∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0198) (0.0546) (0.0170)
Disclosure 0.00737 -0.0125 0.0151 -0.0292 -0.00117
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0198) (0.0546) (0.0170)
Education 0.0126 0.0137 0.0181 0.0336 -0.00817
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0198) (0.0546) (0.0170)
Observations 2003 2009 2009 2009 2009
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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A.1.2 Time: Level versus Logarithm
TheQQ-plots compare quantiles from a theoretical normal distribution to the quantiles
generated from the level of time spent in insurance task, and those from the corresponding
logarithm of time. These diagnostic plots show that the logarithm of time is closer to a
normal distribution.
Figure A.1.1: Overall Time on Insurance Task
(a) Level of Time (seconds) (b) Level of Time (seconds)
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A.2 More Results fromMain Experiment
A.2.1 Summary
Table A.2.1: Summary Statistics - Insurance Task
No Edu Edu
Undisclosed Disclosed Undisclosed Disclosed
Low High Low High Low High Low High
LU0 HU0 LD0 HD0 LU1 HU1 LD1 HD1
Answers 1.43 1.61 1.44 1.60 1.44 1.82 1.52 1.89
Time (sec) 296 291 296 300 392 382 362 365
EduUse (%) . . . . 28.11 32.67 35.20 33.99
EduTime (sec) . . . . 30.62 25.67 30.75 26.15
A.2.2 Effects of Incentives
High incentives improve performance without changing time spent, regardless of dis-
closure treatment.
Figure A.2.1: Effects of Incentives on Performance - Split by Disclosure
(a) Undisclosed (b) Disclosed
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Figure A.2.2: Effects of Incentives on Time - Split by Disclosure
(a) Undisclosed (b) Disclosed
Table A.2.2: Incentive Perception - % of Subjects by Their Answers
No Edu Edu
Undisclosed Disclosed Undisclosed Disclosed
Low High Low High Low High Low High
$2.25 8.7 7.6 16.2 11.2 6.8 7.6 15.2 10.7
$3.5 9.9 9.2 74.3 11.6 12.4 14.3 79.2 7.9
$7 5.9 5.6 6.3 73.5 2.8 4.8 4.4 76.7
Prior: (50%: $3.5, 50%: $7) 75.5 77.7 3.2 3.6 77.9 73.3 1.2 4.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Q: If you always choose the lowest-cost plan, what do you think you earn?
Correct Answer for L: $3.50, for H: $7
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A.2.3 Incentives and Education
Education availability improve performance only under high incentive but increase
time regardless of incentive levels.
Figure A.2.3: Effects of Education Availability on Performance - Split by Incentive
(a) Low Incentive (b) High Incentive
Figure A.2.4: Effects of Education Availability on Time - Split by Incentive
(a) Low Incentive (b) High Incentive
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A.2.4 Heterogeneous Effects








High Incentive x θh 0.218 0.192
(0.134) (0.132)
Edu x θh 0.175 0.217
(0.126) (0.134)
High Incentive x Edu 0.273∗∗ 0.165
(0.123) (0.125)





Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
The regressions control for the disclosure treatment.
A.3 Health Insurance Terms
Below are the glossary definitions, listed alphabetically, used in the experiment.
Coinsurance
The percentage of costs of a covered health care service you pay (20%, for example) after
you’ve paid your deductible.
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Copayment
A fixed amount ($20, for example) you pay for a health care service after you’ve paid your
deductible.
Copayments (sometimes called "copays") can vary for different services within the same
plan, like drugs, lab tests, and visits to specialists.
Deductibles
The amount you pay for health care services before your insurance plan starts to pay. With
a $2,000 deductible, for example, youpay the first $2,000 of services yourself. After youpay
your deductible, you usually pay only a copayment or coinsurance for covered services.
Your insurance company pays the rest.
Maximum Out-of-Pocket
The most you have to pay for services in a plan year. After you spend this amount on
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance, your health plan pays 100% of the costs of
covered benefits. The out-of-pocket limit doesn’t include your monthly premium.
Premiums
The amount you pay for your health insurance every month. In addition to your pre-
mium, you usually have to pay other costs for your health care, including a deductible,
copayments, and coinsurance
127
Appendix B: Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 More on Subject Overview
B.1.1 Demographics and Randomization
Table B.1.1: Demographics: Subjects versus US population
Subjects US Population
Male 55% 49%














Table B.1.2: Number of Subjects by Treatment Arms
Treatment No. Subjects, P1 No. Subject, P2 Retention Rate
LD0 249 192 0.77
LD1 261 187 0.72
LE0 239 180 0.75
LE1 254 194 0.76
HD0 255 191 0.75
HD1 245 180 0.73
HE0 258 195 0.76
HE1 242 177 0.73
All 2003 1496 0.75
B.1.2 Time: Level versus Logarithm
Thefigure below shows that the logarithmof time follows the normal distributionmore
closely. The distribution of level of time is heavily skewed to the right, i.e., some subjects
spend too much time on the task (not necessarily doing the task as MTurk workers may
open a few HITs at the same time and complete them in turn.)
Figure B.1.1: QQ-Plots of Time Spent in the Savings Account Task, P1
(a) Level of Time (b) Logarithm of Time
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Table B.1.3: Balance of Demographics Across Treatments
Age Male College White FinLit (P1) Retention for P2
High Incentives (P1) 0.0831 -0.0350 0.0416∗∗ -0.0184 0.00354 -0.00838
(0.0570) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0190) (0.0525) (0.0194)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.0921 0.00113 -0.00406 0.0162 0.0234 0.00872
(0.0569) (0.0223) (0.0211) (0.0190) (0.0524) (0.0194)
Education (P1) -0.0910 -0.00291 0.0254 0.0157 -0.0555 -0.0209
(0.0570) (0.0223) (0.0212) (0.0190) (0.0524) (0.0194)
Constant 3.433∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 2.754∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.0570) (0.0223) (0.0214) (0.0192) (0.0531) (0.0193)
Observations 2003 1998 2003 2003 2003 2003
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
B.1.3 Self-reported Methods
The table below shows the percentage of subjects choosing each availablemethod in the
debriefing question. In “Other”, subjects fill in what they use. Most of the time, it contains
an elaboration of what has been used, for example, “excel spreadsheet” to correspond to
“calculate”. Note also that subjects can choose more than one method, so the sum is not
100%.
Table B.1.4: Percentage of Subjects by the Self-reported Methods
% of Subjects, P1 % of Subjects, P2
Choose Randomly 6.1% 5.4%
Estimate, without Calculating 64.5% 67.6%
Calculate 29% 26.8%
Use Rule of 72 12.2% 9.4%
Check the Internet 3.8% 2.3%
Ask someone 0.8% 0.6%
Other 3% 3.3%
130
B.2 More on the Treatment Effects in Part 1
Figure B.2.1: Effect of Easiness on Choices and Time
(a) CDF(Number of Correct Answers) (b) CDF(Lg(Time))
Figure B.2.2: Effect of Incentives on Choices and Time
(a) CDF(Number of Correct Answers) (b) CDF(Lg(Time))
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Figure B.2.3: Effect of Education on Choices and Time
(a) CDF(Number of Correct Answers) (b) CDF(Lg(Time))
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Figure B.2.4: Treatment Effects by Question
(a) Effect of Easiness (b) Effect of Incentives
(c) Effect of Education
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B.3 More on Treatment Effects in Part 2
Table B.3.1: Effects of Past Treatment, Easiness × Education, on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 2
FinLit Savings Account
L3-5 Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
Easy Questions -0.0405 0.0780 -0.0446 0.0172
(0.0727) (0.119) (0.141) (0.0776)
Education -0.0722 0.186 -0.246∗ -0.0164
(0.0743) (0.124) (0.144) (0.0805)
Easy x Edu 0.0551 -0.153 0.153 -0.0689
(0.104) (0.173) (0.202) (0.111)
Constant 1.222∗∗∗ 2.074∗∗∗ 2.865∗∗∗ 5.547∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0920) (0.111) (0.0612)
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for incentives.
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Table B.3.2: Effects of Past Treatment, Incentives × Education, on Choices and Time
Outcomes, Part 2
FinLit Savings Account
L3-5 Correct Ans Simple I/R Lg(Time)
High Incentives -0.105 0.0812 -0.173 0.0299
(0.0727) (0.119) (0.141) (0.0775)
Education -0.145∗∗ 0.102 -0.250∗ -0.103
(0.0736) (0.121) (0.142) (0.0767)
High x Edu 0.201∗ 0.0147 0.163 0.105
(0.103) (0.173) (0.202) (0.111)
Constant 1.258∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗∗ 2.869∗∗∗ 5.589∗∗∗
(0.0572) (0.0919) (0.112) (0.0603)
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions control for easiness.
135
B.4 More on the Heterogeneous Effects
Table B.4.1: Heterogeneous Effects on Self-reported Methods
Self-reported Methods, Part 1
Estimation Calculation Rule of 72 Estimation Calculation Rule of 72
θh -0.223∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗
(0.0386) (0.0367) (0.0275) (0.0380) (0.0364) (0.0276)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.0430 0.00821 0.00564 0.0300 0.00552 0.00335
(0.0308) (0.0266) (0.0198) (0.0255) (0.0234) (0.0175)
High Incentives (P1) -0.0219 0.0338 -0.00305 0.0108 -0.0151 0.0000191
(0.0255) (0.0235) (0.0176) (0.0308) (0.0266) (0.0199)
Education (P1) -0.00735 -0.0281 0.0758∗∗∗ -0.00584 -0.0296 0.0760∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0234) (0.0176) (0.0254) (0.0233) (0.0176)
θh × Easy (P1) -0.0298 -0.0184 -0.00581
(0.0546) (0.0523) (0.0393)
θh × High (P1) -0.0898∗ 0.139∗∗ -0.00820
(0.0545) (0.0521) (0.0393)
Constant 0.690∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.0581∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.0577∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0245) (0.0176) (0.0281) (0.0246) (0.0179)
Observations 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387 1387
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table B.4.2: Heterogeneous Effects on Self-reported Methods
Outcomes, Part 1
Estimation Calculation Rule of 72
θh -0.256∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.0383
(0.0382) (0.0365) (0.0235)
Easy Questions (P1) 0.0329 0.000637 0.00454
(0.0255) (0.0234) (0.0175)
High Incentives (P1) -0.0215 0.0354 -0.00390
(0.0255) (0.0234) (0.0175)
Education (P1) -0.0196 0.00339 0.0473∗∗
(0.0307) (0.0265) (0.0198)
θh × Edu (P1) 0.0355 -0.0880∗ 0.0805∗∗
(0.0545) (0.0521) (0.0394)
Constant 0.701∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.0733∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0247) (0.0173)
Observations 1387 1387 1387
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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B.5 Details on the Savings Accounts
Option Compound Deposit Time Deposit
Monthly I/R Hard (P1) Easy (P1) Medium (P2)
A 1% 72 months ago 1000 1050 1000
B 2% 72 months ago 450 400 400
C 3% 72 months ago 200 150 150
D 4% 72 months ago 110 60 70
A 2% 36 months ago 850 800 800
B 4% 36 months ago 400 350 350
C 6% 36 months ago 250 220 250
D 8% 36 months ago 150 200 150
A 1% 72 months ago 900 900 900
B 2% 72 months ago 550 600 550
C 2.5% 72 months ago 250 200 200
D 3% 72 months ago 180 150 150
A 2% 36 months ago 1000 900 900
B 4% 36 months ago 450 400 400
C 6% 36 months ago 300 350 300
D 8% 36 months ago 100 50 50
A 2% 72 months ago 500 500 500
B 3% 72 months ago 300 250 250
C 4% 36 months ago 480 430 450
D 6% 36 months ago 330 380 330
A 2% 72 months ago 600 600 600
B 3% 72 months ago 400 500 450
C 2% 36 months ago 1200 1000 1000
D 3% 36 months ago 800 700 700
Note: The correct answers are in bold. The answers arrived by simple interests are in italics.
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Appendix C: Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 More on Costly Information
Here we look at the formulation where the information cost, κ(·), is continuous. Con-
sider a model in which the DM chooses lotteries based on ṽ(·, ε). ε follows the prior dis-
tribution, µ with mean 0 and variance σ2. Instead of paying an all-or-nothing fixed cost,
the DM can pay to receive a signal Γ(γ) about ε. We identify the signal by the distribution
Γ(·) of the posteriors γ’s satisfying Bayes’ law. Using the definition of Blackwell sufficiency
(Blackwell (1953)), we specify κ(Γ(γ);µ) to depend on the signal and the prior and satisfy
the following conditions.
C1. Weak Monotonicity:
If Γ̃(γ̃) is Blackwell sufficient for Γ(γ), then κ(Γ̃(γ̃);µ) ≥ κ(Γ(γ);µ)
C2. Additivity:




C3. Normalization: κ(µ;µ) = 0
Weak monotonicity and normalization are in line with the rational inattention litera-
ture (Caplin andDean (2015)). When Γ̃(γ̃) is Blackwell sufficient for Γ(γ), decisions based
on Γ̃(γ̃) yield higher utility. It is then intuitive that Γ̃(γ̃) should bemore costly. Meanwhile,
normalization states that no information results in no cost.
Additivity is similar to the sub-additivity condition proposed byZhong (2018). The in-
tuition behind this condition is that combining a two-stage signal into one signal does not
change the cost. In Zhong (2018), the signal combination weakly decreases the cost. We
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will briefly comment on what happens when we allow the signal combination to change
the cost at the end. Note that the usual formulation of information cost using Shannon
entropy satisfies additivity.
Following the main text where there are two stages where the DM can decide, choices
between menus in stage 1 and choices from menus in stage 2, we have two signals Γt(γt),
where t ∈ {1, 2}, corresponding to each stage. This explains the need for a condition
specifying the cost of a combined signal relative to its components.
We can now define the utility of the menus accounting for the signals and the costs. At
stage 2, conditional on the realized posterior from stage 1, γ1, the DM chooses the second
set of signal, Γ2(γ2), and then, the lottery with the highest expected utility.
U2(X, s(X); γ1) = max
p∈X,Γ2(γ2)
EΓ2(γ2) (ṽ(p, s(X), ε))− κ(Γ2(γ2); γ1)
In stage 1, the DM decides based on the expected utility of stage 2, accounting for π,
the survival probability.
U1(X, s(X)) = max
Γ1(γ1)
πEΓ1(γ1) (U2(X, s(X); γ1))− κ(Γ1(γ1);µ)
Let the solutions for the signals be (Γ∗1(γ∗1),Γ∗2(γ∗2), p∗) where Γ∗2(γ∗2) is Blackwell suf-
ficient for Γ∗1(γ∗1) and p∗ is the optimal lottery conditional the realized signals. We also
define a static optimization with only one stage and the optimal solution as (Γ∗0(γ∗0), p∗0).
U0(X, s(X)) = max
p∈X,Γ0(γ0)
EΓ0(γ0) (ṽ(p, s(X), ε))− κ(Γ0(γ0);µ)
There are two useful observations here. First, as π increases, Γ∗1(γ∗1) becomes more
informative because as π increases, the benefit of finding more information in stage 1 in-
creases. Besides, the informativeness of Γ∗1(γ∗1) is bounded above by Γ∗0(γ∗0). At π = 1, the
DM is indifferent over the timing of the signals. The problem is, then, equivalent to a static
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problem, as illustrated below.
U1(X, s(X)) = max
Γ1(γ1)
EΓ1(γ1) (U2(X, s(X); γ1))− κ(Γ1(γ1);µ)
= max
Γ1(γ1),Γ2(γ2),p
EΓ2(γ2) (ṽ(p, s(X), ε))− EΓ1(γ1)(κ(Γ2(γ2); γ1))− κ(Γ1(γ1);µ)
= max
Γ2(γ2),p
EΓ2(γ2) (ṽ(p, s(X), ε))− κ(Γ2(γ2);µ)
= U0(X, s(X))
The first and second lines are only substitutions of the definitions of U1(·) and U2(·).
The third line is due to the additivity of κ(·).




EΓ∗1(γ∗1 ) (U2(X, s(X); γ
∗
1)) = EΓ∗2(γ∗2 ) (ṽ(p





= EΓ∗2(γ∗2 ) (ṽ(p
∗, s(X), ε))− κ(Γ∗2(γ∗2);µ) + κ(Γ∗1(γ∗1);µ)
< EΓ∗0(γ∗0 ) (ṽ(p
∗, s(X), ε))− κ(Γ∗0(γ∗0);µ) + κ(Γ∗1(γ∗1);µ)
The inequality is due to the optimality ofΓ∗0(γ∗0) forU0(·). Observe now that the last row
is the utility of stage 2 if Γ∗0(γ∗0) is used instead of Γ∗2(γ∗2). This contradicts the optimality
of Γ∗2(γ∗2).
With these two observations, we can state the effect of increasing π on PFF.
Remark 6
Consider a model with a continuous cost of information satisfying conditions C1-3. Then, increas-
ing π decrease PFF on average.
To see why remark 6 is true, consider an instance of PFF where s∗(Y ) > 0 for all strict
subsets Y ofX . Similar to exogenous subjective states, when s∗(Y ) > 0, it compensates the
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information shock from Γ∗2(γ∗2). So, for s∗(Y ) to decrease on average, the uncertainty from
Γ∗2(γ
∗
2) relative to Γ∗1(γ∗1) must decrease. This is true when π increases because a higher π
makes Γ∗1(γ∗1) more informative while Γ∗2(γ∗2) is fixed at Γ∗0(γ∗0). Therefore, as π increases,
PFF decreases.
The two observations above correspond to two components for the argument in remark
6. The first is the effect of π on Γ∗1(γ∗1), which relies onminimal assumptions. The second is
the effect of themore informative Γ∗1(γ∗1) on the relative informativeness of Γ∗2(γ∗2) to Γ∗1(γ∗1).
This is where the assumption of additivity is important since it “fixes” Γ∗2(γ∗2).
If an alternative conditions to additivity is considered, for remark 6 to be true, we need
a condition in which a more informative Γ∗1(γ∗1) causes a “slower” increase in informative-
ness in Γ∗2(γ∗2). In this way, we can allow for strict super-additivity (signal combination
strictly increases cost). However, if we allow for strict sub-additivity (signal combination
strictly decreases cost), remark 6 will not be true because the DM will strictly prefer to
delay all costs to stage 2 and obtain only one signal.
C.2 Robustness Checks on PFF
C.2.1 No Menu-Money Mistakes
We present robustness results by excluding subjects who havemademistakes in choos-
ing between menus of money. The results are similar to those in the main text.







PFF - Upper Bound 4.42∗∗∗ 3.55∗∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.76) (0.69)




All tests are one-sided tests. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure C.2.1: PFF - Theoretical Upper Bounds (No Menu-Money Mistakes)
(a) PFF - Indifference (b) PFF - PFC
Figure C.2.2: Extent of PFF (No Menu-Money Mistakes)
(a) PFF by β’s (b) Average min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} by β
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C.2.2 Few Monotonicity Violations
Although the standard models in section 3.2 allows for noises, we proxy how noisy
subjects are by their violations of monotonicity of s̄(·, β)’s and check the robustness of our
results by excluding very noisy subjects. Recall that in the experiment, menus of lotteries
are presented in the increasing order of β. So, monotonicity of s̄(·, β)’s, i.e., increasing
s̄(A, β) and decreasing s̄(B, β) in β, is not a hard requirement. Besides, we allow for a $0.50
deviation from monotonicity: for a fixed β, s̄(A, β + 1) + 0.5 = s̄(A, β) is not considered a
violation (analogously for s̄(B, β)). For example, in figure 3.4.1b, s̄(A, 8) + 0.5 = s̄(A, 7)
and we consider this not to be a violation. In other words, we allow for “trembling” in our
$0.5-spaced MPL grid.
Figure C.2.3 shows the frequency of the monotonicity violations. On average, subjects
have 3.4 violations (the red vertical line). More than half of the subjects have 2 or fewer
violations. We present our robustness check for subjects with 2 or fewer violations, as well
as those with 4 or fewer violations.1 Although the excess of PFF over the upper bounds
is smaller when the violations are less than 2, it is still significant. Overall, the results are
qualitatively similar to those in the main text.







PFF - Upper Bound 1.87∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.80) (0.72)




All tests are one-sided tests. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
1There is no statistically significant correlation betweenmonotonicity violations andmistakes in themenu
of money tasks. So, from the ex-ante view, robustness results using the menu mistakes and monotonicity
violations are not necessarily the same.
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Figure C.2.3: Violations of Monotonicity of s̄(·, β)
Figure C.2.4: PFF - Theoretical Upper Bounds (Monotonicity Violations ≤ 2)
(a) PFF - Indifference (b) PFF - PFC







PFF - Upper Bound 2.25∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.05∗
(0.55) (0.83) (0.75)




All tests are one-sided tests. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Figure C.2.5: Extent of PFF (Monotonicity Violations ≤ 2)
(a) PFF by β’s (b) Average min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} by β
Figure C.2.6: PFF - Theoretical Upper Bounds (Monotonicity Violations ≤ 4)
(a) PFF - Indifference (b) PFF - PFC
Figure C.2.7: Extent of PFF (Monotonicity Violations ≤ 4)
(a) PFF by β’s (b) Average min{s̄(A, β), s̄(B, β)} by β
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